Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Opseg 1Tamar Gendler, John Hawthorne Clarendon Press, 2005 - Broj stranica: 340 Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a major new biennial volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading philosophers in North America, Europe, and Australasia, it will publish exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed. Anyone wanting to understand the latest developments at the leading edge of the discipline can start here. Editorial board includes Stewart Cohen, Keith DeRose, Richard Fumerton, Alvin Goldman, Alan Hajek, Gilbert Harman, Frank Jackson, James Joyce, Scott Sturgeon, Jonathan Vogel, and Timothy Williamson. |
Sadržaj
2 The Fallacy of Epistemicism | 33 |
3 Recent Debates about the A Priori | 69 |
4 Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects | 89 |
Conditioning and Reflection in Asynchronous Systems | 111 |
Understanding and Using the Division of Cognitive Labor | 143 |
7 The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement | 167 |
8 The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions | 197 |
9 Contrastive Knowledge | 235 |
10 Paradox and the A Priori | 273 |
11 Scepticism Rationalism and Externalism | 311 |
| 332 | |
Ostala izdanja - Prikaži sve
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1 Tamar Szabo Gendler,John Hawthorne Pregled nije dostupan - 2005 |
Uobičajeni izrazi i fraze
agent answer argue assertion assume basis believing q believing that dogs brain-in-a-vat causal ceteris paribus circumstances of evaluation classical logic clustering cognitive labor condition consider consistent context of assessment contextualist contrastive contrastivism disagreement division of cognitive dogs bark dogs have existed domain domain of discourse Elga empirical entails epistemic peers epistemic standards Epistemology error theory example explanation expresses externalist fact fallibilism false goldfinch Holmesian inference hypotheses inductive intuitions John John’s justification for believing justified in believing kind knowledge ascriptions knowledge claims Kspq mathematical nominalist objects one’s Oxford perfect recall philosophers pile possible posteriori posteriori justified postulation predicate premise principle Principle of Indifference priori justified probability proposition purely a priori question rational reason relevant rule seems semantics of know sense sentence sentential structure Sleeping Beauty problem snow in Ithaca sorites speakers stole the bicycle Suppose synchronous theory true truth