and the road destroyed. On the next day Humboldt was captured, and an attack was made on Trenton, which was soon surrendered by Col. Fry in command. The railroad depot was burned with all the stores and cotton in it. Other stations on the road, as Dyer, Rutherford, and Keaton, were taken on the same day. The purpose was to destroy every bridge. on the railroad from Columbus to Corinth and Grand Junction, and thus cut off the route for supplies to Gen. Grant's army. The consequence of destroying his depot of supplies, and disturbing his line of communication, was to make Gen. Grant fall back upon Holly Springs. Subsequently Col. Forrest's force was entirely routed by Col. Sweeney.

Meanwhile troops had been collected at Cairo and Memphis, for an expedition against Vicksburg. This had been done within the department of Gen. Grant, and the commander of the expedition, Gen. Sherman, was stationed at Memphis in the same department, and under the command of Gen. Grant. It was an object of Gen. Grant's movements into Mississippi, just related, to reach Jackson in the rear of Vicksburg, and thus cooperate with Gen. Sherman. In this design he was unsuccessful, and obliged to fall back in consequence of the attacks on his line of communication. After falling back upon. Holly Springs, a division of his troops was sent to join Gen. Sherman. The future proceedings of Gen. Grant and of this Expedition properly belong to the record of 1863.

The second campaign in Kentucky and Tennessee during the year was virtually ended. The forces of Gen. Grant were reduced by a detachment of ten thousand men to aid Gen. Sherman in the capture of Vicksburg, which was a part of the new campaign.

Meanwhile the calls of the President for six hundred thousand additional troops were producing their effect. Vast forces were gathering, and new campaigns were about to commence. The great march of the Northwest sweeping everything before it to the Gulf of Mexico, was now to be made. The Government had found that the Western people would bear no longer with its futile efforts to open the Mississippi and to seize the Southern valley. "What we need," said President Lincoln, "is a military success; " money and men had been promptly furnished to the full extent of the request.

This new campaign contemplated the advance of a powerful army under Gen. Rosecrans through Tennessee into Alabama; the movement of a military and naval expedition from Cairo upon Vicksburg; the cooperation of an expedition under Gen. Banks from New Orleans, and thence into Texas; and an advance from Missouri upon Arkansas; and also from Kansas upon the Indian country and northern Texas. Thus the Federal Government would not only open the Mississippi river, but occupy all the Southwestern States, and re

duce the Confederate forces to the limits of the Atlantic States.

On the 25th of October, Gen. Rosecrans was ordered to Cincinnati to take command of the army of the Ohio, as already stated. This command consisted of what remained of the splendid army of Gen. Buell, reënforced by new but raw levies, until it became the second army in size of the United States. The preparation for his campaign was no ordinary effort.

The new troops were to be drilled, disciplined, and made reliable; equipments, arms, horses, and stores of every kind were needed.

The country in which he proposed to march had just been swept of its forage by two armies-that of Gen. Buell, and that of Gen. Bragg. His supplies must come from the States of the Northwest. Only two routes existed for their conveyance: the Cumberland river, which was at too low a stage of water for successful navigation, and the Louisvide and Nashville railroad, on which the bridges had been burned, and the tunnel at Gallatin destroyed. The work of preparation and organization was vigorously begun, and his army soon began to move southward. On the 1st of November Gen. Rosecrans moved to Bowling Green, and on the 5th three divisions of Gen. McCook's corps moved farther on their way to Tennessee.

The commanders of the corps of the whole army were Gens. Thomas, McCook, Rousseau, and Crittenden. On the 7th the corps of Gen. McCook passed through Nashville.

The Louisville and Nashville railroad was completed on the 8th to Mitchellsville on the northern line of Tennessee. On the 10th, Gen. Rosecrans arrived at Nashville, and from that time to the close of the year he was constantly engaged in concentrating, reorganizing, reëquipping, and disciplining his army, acesmulating supplies by the railroad, of which there was only a single track, and preparing for a forward movement. As early as the 25th of November, the Confederate army manifested a purpose to contest the occupation of midcie Tennessee. The railroad bridge at Bridgeport was repaired and troops hurried to Murfrees borough. Gen. Joseph Johnston had been placed in command of this Confederate department, although unable to engage in active field operations. The Confederate forces were stationed at Lavergne, Murfreesborough, McMinnville, &c. Their numbers, under Gen. Bragg, were estimated at forty-five thousand effective men. He had been led to believe by the spies of Gen. Rosecrans that the latter intended to go into winter quarters at Nashville, and had despatched one body of cavalry under Gen. Forrest to cut off Gen. Grant's communication, and another body under Col. Morgan to cut the communication of Gen. Rosecrans in Kentucky, and also a body of infantry to the Confederate army of Mississippi. This appeared to be the opportunity for Gen. Rosecrans to strike an effective blow. At this time, the Federal army

occupied a line of about ten miles on the southeasterly front of Nashville facing south, the right resting on the right of the Franklin turnpike, the centre extending out to Breakville on the Nolinsville turnpike, and the left covered by Mill Creek, some six or eight miles from Nashville, with outposts describing an irregular semicircle, covering a distance of nine miles from the city. To this front the Confederate army presented its force with outposts about two miles distant. Gen. E. Kirby Smith's corps, with part of Col. Morgan's cavalry, occupied the Confederate right; the corps of Gen. Polk, with Col. Wheeler's cavalry brigade, occupied the centre at Lavergne; Gen. Hardee's corps at Triune and Nolinsville, with Col. Wharton's cavalry in front, occupied the left. On the night of the 25th, Christmas, the determination for an advance the next day was made. The respective columns were so disposed as to move down Wilson's, the Nolinsville, Murfreesborough, and Jefferson turnpikes. The general plan was to move a brigade down Wilson's turnpike to protect the right, while Gen. Negley should endeavor to turn the Confederate left and get into its rear; Gen. McCook's corps was to press directly upon Gen. Hardee at Nolinsville and Triune, while Gen. Crittenden pushed down the Murfreesborough and Jefferson turnpikes. At dawn on the 26th, the troops broke up camp with wild shouts and poured along the highways. Gen. McCook's corps marched steadily down the road with skirmishers widely spread out. The Confederates resisted sharply, but were steadily driven, the Federal loss being small. Gen. Crittenden advanced to Lavergne without opposition. The Confederates retired rapidly before his skirmishers. On the next day, the 27th, the Confederate force continued to retire as the Federals advanced with sharp skirmishing. At four o'clock P. M., the Confederate right had been driven over the bridge across Stewart's Creek, on the Jefferson turnpike, which they were prevented from destroying. They were also driven over the bridge across the same creek on the Murfreesborough turnpike so rapidly as to be unable to destroy it. Both structures came into the possession of the Federal forces, all the columns of which had now closed up. It was now apparent from the course of the Confederate retreat that their purpose was to concentrate near Stone Creek or river. On Sunday the 28th, Gen. Thomas advanced his camp across Stewart's Creek, and joined the left. Next day, Gen. McCook moved within seven miles of Murfreesborough, and Gen. Crittenden moved within three miles, Gen. Negley advanced to the centre, and Gen. Rousseau's division was placed in reserve, on the right of Gen. Crittenden. On the 30th, Gen. McCook advanced through thickets, stubbornly resisted by the Confederates, and pressed Gen. Hardee's corps in his front in line of battle. The front of this Confederate corps crossed the Federal right obliquely, in a position which, if extend

ed, would flank it. The centre, under Gen. Negley, was slightly advanced into a cedar wood, and was engaged in reconnoitring under sharp resistance, and in cutting roads through the dense forest to open communication with the right. The left was in a line corresponding with the course of Stone river. The right division of Gen. McCook now faced to the southeast, and two brigades were thrown out on the extreme right, somewhat in reserve. The Confederate force was concentrated within two miles of Murfreesborough, with its right resting on the Lebanon turnpike, thence extending west across Lytle's Creek and the Nashville turnpike, and under the command of Gen. Leonidas Polk. It consisted of three divisions under Gens. Cheatham, Breckinridge, and Buckner. The Confederate centre was composed of three divisions of Gen. E. Kirby Smith; the left was under the command of Gen. Hardee, and rested on the Franklin and Murfreesborough road. This position of the Confederate army gave to it the advantage of strong natural fortifications, with their centre effectually masked by almost impenetrable cedar forests. Constant skirmishing was going on between both forces, and it was manifest that another day would witness the impending battle. At this time assaults were made by cavalry on the Federal rear, and several trains were captured. During the night it was evident that the Confederate forces were massing on the right of Gen. Rosecrans, and his plan was formed to give ground a little, if necessary, on that wing, and to advance the left at the same time into Murfreesborough. The execution of this purpose was prevented by the great force of the Confederate attack on the right.

Early on the morning of the 31st, the attack was made along the entire line of the Federal right under Gen. McCook. The weather was foggy, and the appearance of the Confederate force was sudden. No preparations up to this time for an advance or an assault had been made. An attack very early in the morning had been anticipated; but as it did not come, a degree of carelessness and indifference had taken possession of both officers and men, and all precautions were in a degree abandoned. The opposing lines of the two hostile wings had formed on the opposite sides of a valley which narrowed toward the Federal left. Gen. McCook's corps consisted of three divisions which formed this line. On the left was the division of Gen. Sheridan, in the centre that of Gen. Davis, and on the right that of Gen. Johnson. The attack was made along the entire front at once by the Confederate force, rapidly advancing in double columns. Before the divisions of Gens. Johnson and Davis could form, the Confederate batteries opened upon them, and their infantry soon after became engaged at short range, rapidly advancing and preparing to charge bayonets. Two batteries of Gen. Johnson's division were taken before a gun was fired; and the irregular fire of

original position by the success of Gen. McCook's efforts to recover and hold it, on the third attempt. The division on the extreme left was also moved across Stone river. The position on the right wing was intrenched and the communications in the rear completed. On the morning of the 2d, sharp demonstrations were made along the whole Federal line by the Confederate army, but nothing serious was attempted until three o'clock in the afternoon. At that time the Confederate force burst in mass upon the division across Stone river, as if having discovered the intention of Gen. Rosecrans to advance it in their rear. This attacking force consisted of their entire right wing. The three brigades of the Federal division under Col. Beatty were prepared for the attack and stood their ground manfully, but the overwhelming force finally drove them back across the creek. Gen. Negley's division, which had been formed in reserve as if for this occasion, now advanced, supported by the division of Gen. Davis and the pioneer battalion of Morton. The most bitter conflict of the battle now ensued. Both sides massed their batteries and used them with desperate vindictiveness. The Confederate line wavered and fell back. Gen. Davis was ordered to cross the stream, and Col. Sirwell of the 78th Pennsylvania, placing his hat on the point of his sword, led the way with a shout. Col. Beatty's division followed. An overwhelming and irresistible charge was made on the Confederate line, and it broke and fled. A battery was captured, and a stand of colors. The entire division of Gen. Negley followed up rapidly, and Gen. Rosecrans's whole line immediately advanced. The Confederate right wing was now broken, and the Federal force was gaining the Confederate flank, when resistance on its part became vain and the entire force receded with the loss of many prisoners. The next morning found the Federal line intrenched in its advanced position, but a storm was raging. Quiet prevailed through the day, excepting one or two sharp conflicts resulting in the capture of a Confederate breast work. On the next morning the Confederate army had retired from Murfreesborough, which was subsequently occupied by Gen. Rosecrans. Two divisions were soon sent forward in pursuit of the forces of Gen. Bragg, who fell back to Tallahoma. The Federal loss was 8,485 killed and wounded, and 3,600 missing. The Confederate loss is not known.

The original plan of Gen. Rosecrans to turn the right of the Confederate army and cut off its retreat, was entirely defeated by the failure of the right wing to maintain itself. The subsequent movements of the army of the Cumberland, properly belong to the history of the

year 1863.

The conclusion of the campaign in Virginia remains to be described. Immediately after the battle of Antietam, the Confederate army retired across the Potomac and occupied strong positions on its right bank. All hopes VOL II-11

that the State of Maryland would unite her destinies with the Southern Confederacy were now banished. The invasion had been made by crossing the Potomac within a limit of twelve miles, which is about a mile above the Point of Rocks and five miles below the Monocacy aqueduct on the Chesapeake and Ohio canal. The army then marched through fields, woods, and roads for Frederick. The line of the Chesapeake and Ohio canal for twelve miles presented a scene of desolation. It was tapped at five places. Several floodgates were cut to pieces, and from heights above large boulders of rock were dislodged and thrown into the canal. An unsuccessful attempt was made to blow up the aqueduct at Monocacy. The telegraph lines and the track of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad were much injured. The bridge at Monocacy and portions of the abutments were destroyed. Private property did not escape. Fences were torn down and fields laid desolate.

The influence produced by the activity of the militia of Pennsylvania in responding to the call of the governor to aid in the defence of that State, is acknowledged by Gen. McClellan in the following letter:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, SHARPSBURG, September 27, 1862. GOVERNOR: I beg to avail myself of almost the first moment of leisure I have had since the recent battles to tender to you my thanks for your wise and energetic action in calling out the militia of Pennsylvania for its defence, when threatened by a numerous and victorious army of the enemy. Fortunately circumstances rendered it impossible for the enemy to set foot upon the soil of Pennsylvania, but the moral support rendered to my army by your action was none the less mighty.

In the name of my army and for myself I again tender to you our acknowledgments for your patriotic course. The manner in which the people of Pennsyl vania responded to your call and hastened to the defence of their frontier no doubt exercised a great influence upon the enemy.

I am, very respectfully and sincerely, yours,
GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Maj. Gen. U. S. Army.
Governor of Pennsylvania.

His excellency A. G. CURTIN,

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, October T, 1862. General Order, 163.-The attention of the officers and

soldiers of the Army of the Potomac is called to General Orders, No. 139, War Department, September 24, 1862, publishing to the army the President's proclamation of September 22.

A proclamation of such grave moment to the nation, officially communicated to the army, affords to the General commanding an opportunity of defining specifically to the officers and soldiers under his command the relation borne by all persons in the military service

of the United States toward the civil authorities of the Government.

The Constitution confides to the civil authorities legislative, judicial, and executive-the power and duty of making, expounding, and executing the Federal laws. Armed forces are raised and supported simply to sustain the civil authorities, and are to be held in strict subordination thereto in all respects. The fundamental law of our political system is essential to the security of our republican institutions, and should be thoroughly understood and observed by every soldier. The principle upon which and the objects for which armies shall be employed in suppressing rebellion must be determined and declared by the authorities, and the Chief Executive, who is charged with the administration of the national affairs, is the proper and only source through which the views and orders of the Government can be made known to the armies of the nation.

Discussion by officers and soldiers concerning public measures determined upon and declared by the Gov. ernment, when carried beyond the ordinary, temperate, and respectful expression of opinion, tend greatly to impair and destroy the discipline and efficiency of the troops, by substituting the spirit of political faction for the firm, steady, and earnest support of the authority of the Government, which is the highest duty of the American soldier. The remedy for political errors, if any are committed, is to be found only in the action of the people at the polls.

In thus calling the attention of this army to the true relation between the soldiers and the Government, the General commanding merely adverts to an evil against which it has been thought advisable during our whole history to guard the armies of the Republic, and in so doing he will not be considered, by any right-minded person, as casting any reflection upon that loyalty and good conduct which have been so fully illustrated upon so many battle-fields.

In carrying out all measures of public policy this army will, of course, be guided by the same rules of mercy and Christianity that have ever controlled its conduct toward the defenceless.

By command of Maj. Gen. McCLELLAN.

JAS. A. HARDIE, Lieut.-Col., Aide-de-Camp and Act'g Ass't Adj.-General. On Monday night, Oct. 10, a body of Confederate cavalry of about twenty-five hundred, under Gen. Stuart, suddenly appeared at Chambersburg, Penn., and occupied the place. The Government storehouses and machine shops were burned by them; also the Cumberland Valley railroad depot. On the next day Gen. Stuart marched to Emmettsburg, thence to Woodsborough, New Market, and Monrovia, which place he reached early on Sunday morning. Thus far his force had gathered about one thousand horses. He next pushed for the Potomac, at Noland's Ford, at the mouth of the Monocacy; but finding a Federal force there, he divided his troops and crossed at different places, chiefly at Conrad's Ferry, and six miles below the Monocacy. The entire distance of his march north of the Potomac, was a little over one hundred miles. A large number of Federal troops were put in motion to effect his capture, but without success. Reconnoissances made on the 16th and 17th discovered the Confederate army occupy ing a position extending from Bunker Hill to the Shenandoah river.

It had been expected that Gen. McClellan would take the forces of Gen. Pope's shattered army and march into Maryland and conquer the victorious Confederate force and

pursue them even to Richmond. The inactivity of his army after the battle of Antietam became a subject of complaint. It was overlooked that the low water in the Potomac required time to line its north shore with troops to prevent another invasion of Maryland. It was overlooked that most of his troops had been in active service in the field during the previous six months, and might require most important supplies. On the 6th of October the following despatch was sent by the general-inchief, Gen. Halleck, to Gen. McClellan:

Maj.-Gen. McClellan:

WASHINGTON, D. C., Oct. 6, 1882.

I am instructed to telegraph to you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your line of operation, you can be reenforced with 80,000 men. If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy, bet does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what line you adopt and when you intend to cross be river. Also, to what point the reinforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your opera tions be positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads. I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully concur with the President in

these instructions.

H. W. HALLECK, Gen.-in-Chief.

According to the report of Gen. Halleck, Gen. McClellan disapproved of the plan of crossing the Potomac south of the Blue Ridge, and said that he would cross at Harper's Ferry and advance on Winchester. The advance, however, did not take place until the 26th of October. I became the subject of speculation on the part of the public as to the real nature of the causes of delay. Subsequently, upon the removal of Gen. McClellan from the command of the army, on the 7th of November, the following letter was published:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, Oct. 25, 1562

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:
SIR: In reply to the general interrogatories contained
in your letter of yesterday, I have to report:

ist. That requisitions for supplies to the army under Gen. McClellan are made by his staff officers on the chiefs of bureaus here; that is, for quartermasters' supplies, by his chief quartermaster on the Quarter master-General; for commissary supplies, by his chef commissary on the Commissary-General, &c. No such requisitions have been, to my knowledge, made up the Secretary of War, and none upon the Generai-

Chief.

24. On several occasions Gen, McClellan has trie graphed to me that his army was deficient in certan supplies. All these telegrams were immediately refer red to the heads of bureaus, with orders to repet. It had been immediately filled, except one, where the was ascertained that, in every instance, the requisita as Quartermaster-General had been obliged to send from Philadelphia certain articles of clothing, tents, &c. 1/4 having a full supply here. There has not been, so far as I could ascertain, any neglect or delay, in any de by Gen. McClellan, or by the officers of his staff. T partment or bureau, in issuing all supplies asked fr lays have occasionally occurred in forwarding supplies