by rail, on account of the crowded condition of the depots, or of a want of cars; but whenever notified of this, agents have been sent out to remove the difficulty. Under the excellent superintendence of Gen. Haup, I think these delays have been less frequent and of shorter duration than is usual with freight trains. An army of the size of that under Gen. McClellan will frequently be for some days without the supplies asked for, on account of neglect in making timely requisitions and unavoidable delays in forwarding them and in distributing them to the different brigades and regiments. From all the information I can obtain, I am of opinion that the requisitions from that army have been filled more promptly, and that the men, as a general rule, have been better supplied than our armies operating in the West. The latter have operated at much greater distances from the sources of supply, and have had far less facilities for transportation. In fine, I believe that no armies in the world, while in campaign, have been more promptly or better supplied than ours.

3d. Soon after the battle of Antietam Gen. McClellan was urged to give me information of his intended movements, in order that, if he moved between the enemy and Washington, reënforcements could be sent from this place. On the first of October, finding that he proposed to operate from Harper's Ferry, I urged him to cross the river at once and give battle to the enemy, pointing out to him the disadvantages of delaying till the autumn rains had swollen the Potomac and impaired the roads. On the 6th of October he was peremptorily ordered to "cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now, while the roads are good." It will be observed that three weeks have elapsed since this order was given.

4th. In my opinion there has been no such want of supplies in the army under Gen. McClellan as to prevent his compliance with the orders to advance against the enemy. Had he moved to the south side of the Potomac he could have received his supplies almost as readily as by remaining inactive on the north side.

5th. On the 7th of October, in a telegram in regard to his intended movements, Gen. McClellan stated that it would require at least three days to supply the first, fifth, and sixth corps; that they needed shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing, as well as shelter tents. No complaint was made that any requisitions had not been filled, and it was inferred from his language that he was only waiting for the distribution of his supplies.

On the 11th he telegraphed that a portion of his supplies sent by rail had been delayed. As already stated, agents were immediately sent from here to investigate this complaint, and they reported that everything had gone forward. On the same date (the 11th) he spoke of many of his horses being broken down by fatigue. On the 12th he complained that the rate of supply was only "one hundred and fifty horses per week for the entire army there and in front of Washington."

I immediately directed the Quartermaster-General to inquire into this matter and report why a larger supply was not furnished. Gen. Meigs reported on the 14th that the average issue of horses to Gen. McClellan's army in the field and in front of Washington for the previous six weeks had been 1,459 per week, or 8,754 in all. In addition, that large numbers of mules had been supplied, and that the number of animals with Gen. McClellan's army on the upper Potomac was over thirty-one thousand. He also reported that he was then sending to that army all the horses he could procure.

On the 18th Gen. McClellan stated, in regard to Gen. Meigs's report that he had filled every requisition for shoes and clothing: "Gen. Meigs may have ordered these articles to be forwarded, but they have not reached our depot, and, unless greater effort to insure prompt transmission is made by the department of which Gen. Meigs is the head, they might as well remain in New York or Philadelphia, so far as this army is concerned." I immediately called Gen. Meigs's attention to this apparent neglect of his department. On the 25th he reported, as the result of his investigation, that 48,000 pairs of boots and shoes had been received by the quar

termaster of Gen. McClellan's army at Harper's Ferry, Frederick, and Hagerstown; that 20,000 pairs were at Harper's Ferry depot on the 21st; that 10,000 more were on their way, and 15,000 more ordered. Col. Ingals, aide-de-camp and chief quartermaster to Gen. McClellan, telegraphed, on the 25th: "The suffering for want of clothing is exaggerated, I think, and certainly might have been avoided by timely requisitions of regimental and brigade commanders." On the 24th he telegraphed to the Quartermaster-General that the clothing was not detained in cars at the depots: "Such complaints are groundless. The fact is, the clothing arrives and is issued, but more is still wanted. I have ordered more than would seem necessary from any data furnished me, and I beg to remind you that you have always very promptly met all my requisitions, so far as clothing is concerned. Our department is not at fault. It provides as soon as due notice is given. I foresee no time when an army of over 100,000 men will not call for clothing and other articles."

In regard to Gen. McClellan's means of promptly communicating the wants of his army to me or to the proper bureaus of the War Department, I report that, in addition to the ordinary mails, he has been in hourly communication with Washington by telegraph.

It is due to Gen. Meigs that I should submit herewith a copy of a telegram received by him from Gen. McClellan. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. W. HALLECK, Gen.-in-Chief. UNITED STATES MILITARY Telegraph.

Received, Oct. 22, 1862–9 40 P. M.

From McClellan's Headquarters.

TO BRIG. GEN. MEIGS: Your despatch of this date is received. I have never intended, in any letter or despatch, to make any accusation against yourself or your department for not furnishing or forwarding clothing as rapidly as it was possible for you to do. I believe that everything has been done that could be done in this respect. The idea that I have tried to convey was, that certain portions of the command were without clothing, and the army could not move until it was supplied.

G. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj.-Gen.

Nothing has been made public on the part of Gen. McClellan alluding to or explaining the causes of the delay of the movements of the army. Strict justice requires that, in estimating the importance of the preceding letters, the testimony of Gen. Burnside on a subsequent page should be considered. It was generally understood that Gen. McClellan's movement was delayed by the want of clothing and other supplies, and especially on account of his deficiency in cavalry and artillery horses. The purchase and forwarding of these was going on even up to the day of his crossing the Potomac. One army corps did not receive its clothing until it had commenced its march in Virginia. It was stated by several commanders that they made every effort to get the clothing for their troops, repeatedly sent teams to the railroad depots for it, and until a short time previous to the marching of the army they were invariably told that the clothing had not arrived.

Early on the 26th of October a cavalry force, under Col. Pleasanton, crossed the Potomac on the new pontoon bridge at Berlin, and moved on in the direction of Purcellville. Soon after the corps of Gen. Burnside began to cross in light marching order, followed by an immense train of wagons, and took a position near Lovettsville. On the next day a heavy reënforcement joined him. About the same

gaps of the Blue Ridge to Culpepper. The larger part of his force had passed through, when the gaps were taken and held by Gen. McClellan. At the same time Gen. Sigel had advanced from Washington, and lay near the Blue Ridge, covering at once Washington, observing the gaps to the Rappahannock, and protecting the railroad communication to that river. The bridge at Rappahannock Station had already been seized by the cavalry, under Gen. Bayard. The available force of Gen. McClellan was about one hundred and twenty thousand men; that of Gen. Lee consisted of about sixty thousand able men at Culpepper and Gordonsville, and thirty thousand in the Shenandoah Valley, near Strasburg. The distance from Warrenton to Gordonsville is about fifty miles, and from Warrenton to the Rapidan, thirty-five miles; from Strasburg to Gordonsville, by Staunton and Charlottesville, one hundred and thirty-five miles; and by the only other practicable route, one northwest of Gordonsville, and perpendicular to Gen. McClellan's line of advance, about one hundred miles. In his position it was necessary for Gen. Lee to defend the line of the Rapidan, or endeavor to effect a junction with the force in the Shenandoah Valley, under Gen. Jackson, or fall back upon Richmond, in a country without a line of defence, with Gen. McClellan close upon him, leaving Gen. Jack son to shift for himself. The defence of the Rapidan was impracticable from the course of the river from the Alexandria railroad to the Blue Ridge. The efforts to join Gen. Jackson would have uncovered Richmond, and the attempt to fall back on Richmond would have at least hazarded the demoralization of his army, and enabled Gen. McClellan to turn the defensible parts of the Rappahannock, and the line of the North Anna. The appointment of Gen. Burnside was followed by the organization of a portion of the army into divisions, and a movement to concentrate it at Fredericksburg. On the 12th Gen. Burnside issued the following address to the army:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Nov. 10, 1862.

In accordance with General Orders, No. 182, issued by the President of the United States, I hereby assume command of the Army of the Potomac. Patriotism, and the exercise of my every energy in the direction of this army, aided by the full and hearty cooperation of its officers and men, will, I hope, under the blessing of God, insure its success.

Having been a sharer of the privations, and a witness of the bravery of the old Army of the Potomac in the Maryland campaign, and fully identified with them in their feelings of respect and esteem for Gen. McClellan, entertained through a long and most friendly association with him, I feel that it is not as a stranger I assume command.

To the 9th army corps, so long and intimately associated with me, I need say nothing. Our histories are identical. With diffidence for myself, but with a proud confidence in the unswerving loyalty and determination of the gallant army now intrusted to my care, I accept its control, with the steadfast assurance that the just cause must prevail. [Signed]

A. E. BURNSIDE.
Major-General Commanding.
On the 12th the general-in-chief (Halleck)

A movement was made at this time by Gen. Jackson for the purpose of detaching a portion of the army of the Potomac. He occupied all the roads west and north of Winchester as far as Big Cacapon Bridge on the northwestern turnpike, and from Pughtown to Bath and Hancock. He was thus looking westward, at the same time he was in a position to cross the Potomac. His movement failed to effect his design.

Meanwhile the mass of Gen. Lee's forces retired to Gordonsville. On the 16th the forces of Gen. Burnside began to move for Fredericksburg, as had been previously determined in consultation on the 12th between Gens. Halleck and Burnside. On the 15th the evacuation of Warrenton and the adjacent places was commenced, and by the morning of the 18th it was entirely completed. The advance was led by Gen. Sumner. At the same time supplies were sent to Aquia Creek, and the repairs of the railroad track to Fredericksburg commenced, and the army concentrated at Falmouth opposite Fredericksburg.

The march to Richmond, it appeared, was to be made by the route from Fredericksburg. This city is on the south bank of the Rappahannock, and sixty-five miles distant from Richmond. It is connected with the latter place by a railroad, of which there is a double line nearly to Hanover Junction, twenty-three miles from Richmond. The railroad crosses the Mattapony river at Milford, thirty-seven miles from Fredericksburg, and the Pamunkey, twentyfive miles from Richmond, besides a number of smaller streams. Between Falmouth, where the Federal army concentrated, and Richmond there are two main and two minor lines of de

fence. The first that of the Rappahannock river. Above Falmouth its abrupt banks, which are lined with high hills, difficult of access, and its narrow fords and rocky bottom render a rapid crossing for a large force almost impossible. Below, the valley of the river expands, spreading often into spacious plains, while the winding course of the stream forms numerous necks of land, easily commanded from the north side, and giving secure crossing places, and ample ground for the formation of troops. At Fredericksburg the north commands the south bank and much of the distance, which is a mile and a half, to the frowning hills or table land beyond. But these heights equally command this intermediate plain, and are unassailable in front except by infantry. Next in the rear and twelve miles distant, is the line of the Po river and Stannard's Marsh, which is hardly available except to hold a pursuing foe in check. The North Anna is about forty miles from the Rappahannock, and affords another principal line of defence. It is a deep and rapid stream, with a narrow valley. The table land on its north bank is about one hundred feet above the bed of the river, and about one hundred and fifty on the south bank. The extension of its line after it turns to join the South Anna, and becomes the Pamunkey, presents scarcely less obstacles than the river itself, so well is the ground guarded by swamps and flanked by streams. The last and a minor line of defence is the South Anna river, with the southern commanded by the northern bank, and too near the North Anna for a second formation by a force that has been badly defeated. Numerous small streams parallel to the line of advance present suitable points for resistance, and protect foes attacking the line of communication, while the bridges over them are weak points necessary to be securely guarded.

By the 20th a considerable force had reached Falmouth. Gen. Sumner on the next day sent to Fredericksburg the following summons to surrender:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Nor. 21, 1862.

To the Mayor and Common Council of Fredericksburg: GENTLEMEN: Under cover of the houses of your city shots have been fired upon the troops of my command.

Your mills and manufactories are furnishing provisions and materials for clothing for armed bodies in rebellion against the Government of the United States; your railroads and other means of transportation are removing supplies to the depots of such troops.

This condition of things must terminate, and by direction of Gen. Burnside, I accordingly demand the surrender of the city into my hands, as the represent ative of the Government of the United States, at or before five o'clock this afternoon.

Failing an affirmative reply to this demand by the hour indicated, sixteen hours will be permitted to elapse for the removal from the city of women and children, the sick and wounded, and aged, &c.; which period having expired, I shall proceed to shell the

town.

Upon obtaining possession of the city, every necesary means will be taken to preserve order and secure

the protective operation of the laws and policy of the United States Government.

I am, very respectively, your obedient servant,
E. V. SUMNER,
Brevet Maj.-Gen. U. S. army,
Commanding Eighth Grand Division.

In reply the mayor of the city, M. Slaughter, stated that the firing complained of occurred in the suburbs, and was the act of the Confederate officer in command, for which neither the citizens nor authorities were responsible. The other matters complained of, he said, The civil authorities of Fredericksburg have should no longer exist, and proceeded thus: no control; but I am assured by the military authorities of the Confederate army near here that nothing will be done to infringe the conditions herein named, as to matters within the town; but the latter authorities inform us that, while their troops will not occupy the town, they will not permit yours to do so."

The late hour at which the summons was received rendered it impossible to remove the women and children in the time allowed.

The reply of Gen. Sumner to the mayor was as follows: HEADQUARTERS RIGHT GRAND DIVISION, CAMP NYAR Į FALMOUTH, Nov. 21, 1862.

To the Mayor and Common Council of Fredericksburg:

Your letter of this afternoon is at hand, and in consideration of your pledge that the acts complained of shall cease, and that your town shall not be occupied by any of the enemy's forces, and your assertion that the women, children, sick, wounded, and aged. I am a lack of transportation renders it impossible to more authorized to say to you that our batteries will not open upon the town at the hour designated. Gen. Patrick will meet a committee of representatives from Lacy House. your town to-morrow morning at nine o'clock at the

Very respectfully your obedient servant, E. V. SUMNER, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Commanding Division. An interview was subsequently held as above mentioned, which resulted in the following note from Gen. Sumner:

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT GRAND DIVISION, NOT. 22. 1982 To the Mayor and Common Council, Fredericksburg : I am authorized to say that so long as no bestle demonstration is made from the town it will not be shelled. I have also to say that there will be no firing upon the cars before 11 o'clock P. M. to-morrow. I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant, E. V. SUMNER,

Brevet Maj.-Gen. U. S. A., Commanding. The firing upon the cars of the railroad above mentioned was in consequence of the be lief that they were used to remove military stores from Fredericksburg.

As Gen. Burnside's ariny concentrated ca the north bank, Gen. Lee's forces concentrated on the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg. Had the pontoon bridges required been at hand when the advance reached Falmouth, the line of the Rappahannock would have been taken without opposition. Then, with proper sup plies and bridges, thirty of the sixty miles to Richmond would have been placed within the reach of Gen. Burnside, and perhaps a lodg‐

ment have been effected on the banks of the North Anna. Nearly thirty days elapsed before the pontoons arrived and the bridges were completed. The ensuing military operations were investigated by a committee of Congress, before whom Gen. Burnside testified as follows: Gen. Halleck came down to see me on the 11th of November. On the 9th I made out a plan of operations, in accordance with the order of Gen. Halleck, which directed me not only to take the command, but also to state what I proposed to do with it. That plan I wrote on the morning of the 9th of November, and sent it by special messenger to Washington. I can furnish the committee a copy of that plan if they desire it. I do not have it here now.

Question-State the substance of it, if you please. That may do as well.

Answer.-I stated, in substance, that I thought it advisable to concentrate the army in the neighborhood of Warrenton, to make a small movement across the Rappahannock as a feint, with a view to divert the attention of the enemy, and lead them to believe we were going to march in the direction of Gordonsville, and then to make a rapid movement of the whole army to Fredericksburg, on this side of the Rappabannock.

As my reasons for that, I stated that the farther we got into the interior of Virginia, the longer would be our lines of communication and the greater would be the difficulty we would have in keeping them open, as the enemy had upon our right flank a corps that almost at any time could, by a rapid movement, seriously embarrass us. If we were caught by the elements so far from our base of supplies, and at the same time in the enemy's country, where they had means of getting information that we had not, it might, I thought, prove disastrous to the army, as we had but one line of railway by which to supply it.

In moving upon Fredericksburg we would all the time be as near Washington as would the enemy, and after arriving at Fredericksburg, we would be at a point nearer to Richmond than we would be even if we should take Gordonsville. On the Gordonsville line, the enemy, in our opinion, would not give us a decisive battle at any place this side of Richmond. They would defend Gordonsville until such time as they felt they had given us a check, and then with so many lines of railroad open to them, they would move upon Richmond or upon Lynchburg, and in either case the difficulty of following them would be very great.

In connection with this movement I requested that barges filled with provisions and forage should be floated to Aquia Creek, where they could easily be landed; that materials be collected for the reconstruction of the wharves there, and that all the wagons in Washington that could possibly be spared should be filled with hard bread and small commissary stores, and, with a large number of beef cattle, started down to Fredericksburg on the road by way of Dumfries; and that this wagon train and load of cattle should be preceded by a pontoon train large enough to span the Rappahannock twice. I stated that this wagon train could move in perfect safety, because it would be all the time between our army and the Potomac; or in other words our army would be all the time between the enemy and that train. But at the same time I said that if a cavalry escort could not be furnished from Washington, I would send some of my cavalry to guard the train.

On the morning of the 14th of November, feeling uneasy with reference to the pontoons, as I had not heard of their starting, I directed my chief engineer to telegraph again in reference to them.

He telegraphed to Gen. Woodbury or to Major Spaulding. It subsequently appeared that that was the first they ever had heard of any wish to have the pontoon train started down to Fredericksburg, although the authorities in Washington had had my plans sent

to them on the 9th of November; and it had also been discovered by Gen. Halleck and Gen. Meigs, at my headquarters, on the night of the 11th and 12th of November; and after discovering it fully there, they sat down and sent telegrams to Washington, which, as I supposed, fully covered the case, and would secure the starting of the pontoon trains at once. I supposed, of course, that those portions of the plan which required to be attended to in Washington would be carried out there at once. I could have sent officers of my own there to attend to those matters, and perhaps I made a mistake in not doing so, as Gen. Halleck afterward told me that I ought not to have trusted to them in Washington for the details.

In reply to the telegram I had ordered to be sent, Gen. Woodbury telegraphed back that the pontoon train would start on Sunday morning probably, and certainly on Monday morning, which would have been on the 16th and 17th of November, and would have been in time. They did not, however, start until the 20th, and on that day it commenced raining, which delayed them so much and the roads became so bad that when they got to Dumfries they floated the pontoons off the wagons. We then sent to Washington for a steamer, and carried them down to Aquia Creek by water, sending the wagons around by land. The pontoons did not get here until the 22d or 23d of November.

On the 15th of November I started the column down the road to Fredericksburg, not knowing anything about the delay in the starting of the pontoons, because the telegram announcing the delay did not reach Warrenton Junction until had left to come down here

with the troops, and that telegram did not reach me until I arrived here on the morning of the 19th, when it was handed to me by an orderly who had brought it down to Warrenton Junction.

After reaching here I saw at once that there was no chance for crossing the Rappahannock with the army at that time. It commenced raining and the river began to rise-not to any great extent, but I did not know how much it might rise. There were no means of crossing except by going up to the fords, and it would be impossible to do that because of the inability to supply the troops after they should cross.

Gen. Sumner, with his command, arrived here in advance. He sent to me, asking if he should cross the river. He was very much tempted to take his own men across to Fredericksburg by a ford near Falmouth, as there was no enemy there except a very small force. I did not think it advisable that he should cross at that time.

The plan I had in contemplation was, if the stores and these bridges had come here as I expected, to throw Sumner's whole corps across the Rappahannock, fill the wagons with as many small stores as we could, and having beef cattle along for meat, then to make a rapid movement down in the direction of Richmond and try to meet the enemy and fight a battle before Jackson could make a junction there. We knew that Jackson was in the valley, and felt confident that there was force enough on the upper Rappahannock to take care of him. We felt certain that as soon as the enemy knew of our crossing down here, the force of Jackson would be recalled, and we wanted to meet this force and beat it before Jackson could come down on our flank and perhaps cripple us.

I had recommended that some supplies should be sent to the mouth of the Rappahannock with a view of establishing a department at Port Royal. After we had advanced to Fredericksburg, and after the first delay in starting the pontoons, I think they were sent as quickly as they could have been, and the supplies and quartermasters' stores have been always in as great abundance as we could have expected, for after the 19th of November the roads were particularly bad. Horses and mules were sent down to us, so that our cavalry and teams were in very good condi. tion.

After it was ascertained that there must be a delay, and that the enemy had concentrated such a force