as to make it very difficult to cross, except by a number of bridges, we commenced bringing up from Aquia Creek all the pontoons we could. After enough of them had been brought up to build the bridges, I called several councils of war to decide about crossing the Rappahannock. It was at first decided to cross at Shinker's Neck, about twelve miles below here, but our demonstration was simply for the purpose of drawing down there as large a force of the enemy as possible.

I then decided to cross here because, in the first place, I felt satisfied that they did not expect us to cross here but down below. In the next place I felt satisfied that this was the place to fight the most decisive battle, because if we could divide their forces by penetrating their lines at one or two points, separating their left from their right, then a vigorous attack with the whole army would succeed in breaking their army in pieces.

The enemy had cut a road along on the rear of the line of the heights where we made our attack, by means of which they connected the two wings of their army, and avoided a long detour round through a bad country. I obtained from a colored man from the other side of the town information in regard to this new road, which proved to be correct. I wanted to obtain possession of the new road, and that was my reason for making an attack on the extreme left. I did not intend to make the attack on the right until that position had been taken, which I supposed would stagger the enemy, cutting their lines in two. And then I proposed to make a direct attack on their front, and drive them out of the works.

By Mr. Gooch: Do I understand you to say that it was your understanding that Gen. Halleck and Gen. Meigs, while at your headquarters in Warrenton, and before you commenced the movement of your army, sent orders to Washington for the pontoons to be immediately forwarded to Falmouth?

Answer: That was my understanding, certainly. Question: In your judgment, could the pontoons have been forwarded to you in time for you to have crossed the Rappahannock when you expected, if all possible efforts had been made by those charged with that duty?

Answer: Yes, sir, if they had received their orders in time.

Question: Did the non-arrival of these pontoons at the time you expected prevent your crossing when you expected to cross and interfere with the success of your plans?

Answer: Yes, sir.

Thus it was the design of Gen. Burnside that the pontoons should leave Alexandria on Nov. 11, and arrive at Falmouth at the same time with the advance of his army. The right grand division reached Falmouth on Nov. 17. The pontoons left Alexandria on Nov. 19, and arrived at Fredericksburg after the movements of Gen. Burnside had not only become known, but after Gen. Lee had advanced his forces from Gordonsville to the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg, and had fortified them. They were not used until the night of Dec. 10.

A plan for the movements of Gen. Burnside had now been arranged between President Lincoln, Gen. Halleck, and himself, by which it was determined that the army should move across the Rappahannock at a certain place and at a certain time. This was departed from by Gen. Burnside, who was induced to move the army across at a different place and at an earlier day. His reasons for this change he thus states in his report:

During my preparations for crossing at the place

I had first selected, I discovered that the enemy had thrown a large portion of his force down the river and elsewhere, thus weakening his force in front, and also thought I discovered that he did not anticipate the crossing of our whole force at Fredericksburg, and I hoped by rapidly throwing the whole command over at that place to separate by a vigorous attack the forces of the enemy on the river below from the force behind and on the crest in the rear of the town, in which case we could fight him with the greatest advantage in our favor. To do this we had to gain a height on the extreme right of the crest, which Leight commanded a new road lately made by the enemy for the purpose of more rapid communication along his lines; which point gained, his position along the crest would have been scarcely tenable, and he could have been driven from them easily by an attack on his front in connection with a movement in rear of the

crest.

During the night of the 10th of December, therefore, the pontoons were conveyed to the river, and the artillery to the number of one hundred and forty-three pieces was placed in position opposite the city. Between four and five o'clock on the morning of the 11th, the work of building four bridges was commenced. One was to be made at the point where the railroad bridge formerly crossed, and two others opposite the city but nearer Falmouth, and the fourth nearly two miles below for the crossing of the left wing under Gen. Franklin. A dull haze so obscured the movement, that it was not discovered for some time by the CCDfederate pickets. The bridges were thus partly constructed, when a brisk and deadly fire and windows of the houses was opened, which of musketry from along the banks of the river compelled the workmen to stop. They fled to the cover of the surrounding hills where they formed again, and about six o'clock the work was recommenced. The Confederates had now become aroused to a sense of what was going forward, and with reenforcements of sharpshooters swarmed the opposite bank and houses. The pontonniers, nothing daunted by the hot fire poured upon them, went bravely to work. A storm of bullets covered them. The planks and boats were riddled by every volley. Once more they were compelled to withdraw, and again fell back to the cover of the ridge of hills running parallel with the river. Orders were now given to the artillery to open fire on the city. The Federal batteries commenced an almost simultaneous bombardment, directing their fire chiefly at the houses in which the sharpshooters had concealed themselves. At the first fire they be came untenable, and the riflemen retreated to the rear of the town, and took shelter behind the buildings unharmed. The fire of the ar tillery, which commenced at seven o'clock, was fog somewhat obscured its results, but bodcontinued incessantly until one o'clock. The ies of the Confederates with great stubbornerate batteries on the heights in the rear conness still kept within the city. The Confedtinued silent. Not a gun was fired, About ten o'clock, the workmen were again formed for a third attempt to build the bridges. Vol

unteers joined them from the 8th Connecticut. Some planks were seized and carried out to the end of a string of boats and placed in position, when a galling fire from sharpshooters in rifle pits near the edge of the water again interrupted them, and they were recalled. Meantime the bombardment was continued, and several houses in the city had taken fire. In the afternoon, several pontoon boats, loaded with volunteers from the 7th Michigan and 19th Massachusetts, were sent over. They chased the Confederate sharpshooters from their hiding places, and the bridges were finished without further interruption. On the other side a scene of destruction presented itself. The walls of houses were breached, roofs had fallen in, and the interiors were destroyed.

No sooner were the bridges completed than the troops began to cross, and before dusk Gen. Sumner's grand division had gone over, and a section of Gen. Hooker's. All had rations for three days, and blankets for a bivouac. The grand division of Gen. Franklin, consisting of the corps of Gens. Reynolds and Smith, crossed over at the lower bridge, which was built earlier in the day without interruption, as there was a plain before it which the artillery could easily have swept. The troops commenced crossing again early on the morning of the 12th without molestation. Some sharp resistance had been made by the Confederate soldiers to those who crossed on the previous day, but these were driven out of the city or killed. During the afternoon fire was opened upon the city by the Confederate batteries on the nearest heights, which was replied to by the Federal batteries, and soon ceased. The occupation of Fredericksburg had now been successfully made. No greater opposition had been presented by the forces of Gen. Lee than was sufficient to tempt the Federal troops to press forward with greater ardor. The next movement was to drive the Confederate forces from their positions on the heights. These positions consisted of two lines of batteries, one a mile in rear of the other, and both overlooking the city. They extended, in the form of a semicircle, from Port Royal to a point about six miles above Fredericksburg. Their right wing, under Gen. Jackson, extended from Port Royal to Guinney's Station on the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad; the centre, under Gen. Longstreet, extended to the telegraph road; the left, under Gen. Stuart, was west of Massaponax Creek. A reserve corps was commanded by Gen. A. P. Hill. This was the force which had fought at Richmond and in Maryland.

Friday night and Saturday morning, the 13th, were spent by Gen. Burnside in making a proper disposition of his forces. The left was occupied by Gen. Franklin with his grand division, the centre by Gen. Hooker, and the right by Gen. Sumner.

The right of Gen. Franklin rested on the outskirts of the city, his centre was advanced

about a mile from the river, and his left was on the Rappahannock, about three miles below. The action commenced on the extreme left by an annoying fire from a Confederate battery, which the 9th New York was ordered to charge and capture. In this attempt they were repulsed. A brigade was brought to their aid by Gen. Tyler, and another attempt made, but the fire was so deadly that it failed of success. The battle now became more general, and another attempt was made to capture the battery. No advantage was gained at this time, but a severe loss was suffered. The conflict now extended along the whole line of the left, and a desperate effort was made to drive the Confederates across the Massaponax Creek by turning their position. The ground was contested most obstinately, but the Confederates gradually fell back, occasionally making a most desperate stand, until night, when Gen. Franklin had succeeded in gaining nearly a mile, and his troops occupied the field. The right of Gen. Franklin's division, under Gen. Reynolds, encountered the fire of the Confederate artillery on the heights, and although the conflict was most deadly, no advantage was gained.

The

On the right, under command of Gen. Sumner, the action commenced about ten o'clock and was furious during the rest of the day. The Confederate forces occupied the woods and hills in the rear of the city, from which it soon became evident they could not be driven except at the point of the bayonet. charge was ordered to be made by the division of Gen. French supported by that of Gen. Howard. Steadily the troops moved across the plain, until they were within a dozen yards of the ridge, when they were suddenly met by a galling fire from the Confederate infantry posted behind a stone wall. For a few minutes the head of the column exhibited some confusion; but quickly forming into line it retired back to a ravine within musket shot of the Confederates. Here they were reënforced by fresh troops who fearlessly advanced to their aid under a most destructive fire of artillery. The line of assault was now formed again, and with bayonets fixed and a double-quick step, they rushed forward to seize the Confederate artillery. From the first step they encountered a terrific fire of infantry and artillery. No veterans could face that shock. They were thrown into confusion and brought to a sudden halt. At this juncture the centre quivered, faltered, and fled in disorder, but was afterward rallied and brought back. Three times was the attack thus made to dis

lodge those batteries. But each time it was in vain. The ranks of the storming party, shrunk to small limits, retired. The entire force of his artillery was now brought by Gen. Sumner to bear upon the enemy, and thus the contest was kept up until dark. At night the Confederate force occupied their original position, and the wounded and the dead remained where they

had fallen. Every attempt to remove them by the Federal troops was defeated by the Confederate infantry.

In the centre, under the command of Gen. Hooker, skirmishing commenced early in the morning; and during the forenoon, while the fog prevailed, a terrific contest, chiefly with artillery, was kept up on both sides. The Con federate position appeared to be invulnerable to artillery, and about noon preparations were made for storming it. The troops marched steadily up within musket shot of the batteries, and were there met by such a destructive fire of artillery and rifles as drove them back with a heavy loss. Reënforcements were obtained, and the attempt to take the batteries was repeated in the afternoon, but without success. The contest continued with great fierceness until night. About half past five the firing of musketry ceased, but that of the artillery continued until long after dark.

On the next day, Sunday the 14th, both armies remained comparatively quiet. Some skirmishing and artillery fire took place for a short time. Gen. Burnside sent the following despatch to President Lincoln early in the morning:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC, }

FOUR O'CLOCK, A. M., December 14. THE PRESIDENT: I have just returned from the field. Our troops are all over the river and hold the first ridge outside the town and 3 miles below. We hope to carry the crest to-day. Our loss is heavy-say 5,000. A. E. BURNSIDE, Major-General Commanding.

On Monday, both armies continued in the same position. The Confederates had strengthened some of their works. During the ensuing night, the army evacuated Fredericksburg and retired across the river to its former position. The artillery crossed first, followed by the infantry, the last of whom left about daylight. The pontoon bridges were then removed and all communication cut off. The movement was not perceived by the Confederates until it was too late to do any injury to the retreating force. The following is the despatch of Gen. Burnside announcing this move

ment:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC, SIX O'CLOCK P. M., December 16, 1862. Maj. Gen. HALLECK: The army was withdrawn to this side of the river because I felt the position in front could not be carried, and it was a military necessity either to attack or retire. A repulse would have been disastrous to us. The army was withdrawn at night, without the knowledge of the enemy, and without loss either of property or men. A. E. BURNSIDE,

Major-General Commanding.

The Federal loss was as follows: Gen. Sumner's division on the right, killed, 473; wounded, 4,090; missing. 748, Total, 5,311,

Gen. Hooker's division on the centre, killed, 326; wounded, 2,468; missing, 754. Total, 3,548.

Gen. Franklin's division on the left, killed, 889; wounded, 2,547; missing, 576. Total,

3,462. Grand total, killed, 1,138; wounded, 9,105; missing, 2,078. Total, 12,321. The Confederate loss was comparatively small, having been sheltered by their works. Gen. Burnside, in his report to the general. in-chief, thus explains his defeat:

How near we came to the accomplishment of our object future reports will show. But for the fog, and the unexpected and unavoidable delay in building the bridges, which gave the enemy 24 hours to concentrate tainly have succeeded, in which case the battle would his forces in his strong position, we would almost cuthave been, in my opinion, far more decisive than if we had crossed at the places first selected. As it was, we came very near success. Failing in accomplishing the main object, we remained in order of battle two days, long enough to decide that the enemy would not coze out of his strongholds to fight me with his infantry, after which we recrossed to this side of the river us molested, without the loss of men or property.

As the day broke our long lines of troops were seen marching to their different positions as if going on pa rade-not the least demoralization or disorganization existed.

To the brave officers and soldiers who accomplished the feat of thus recrossing in the face of the enery, 1 owe everything. For the failure in the attack, I am responsible, as the extreme gallantry, courage, and would have carried the points had it been possible. endurance shown by them were never exceeded, and

To the families and friends of the dead I can only offer my heartfelt sympathies, but for the wounded I can offer my earnest prayer for their comfort and anal

recovery.

The fact that I decided to move from Warrenton ra to this line rather against the opinion of the President, Secretary of War, and yourself, and that you have left the whole movement in my hands, without givug me orders, makes me the more responsible.

Thus closed the third campaign against were made by either army during the year. On Richmond. No further hostile demonstrations the 31st of December, the Confederate general Lee issued the following address to his troops:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, ?
Dec. 21, 1863

General Order, No. 38.

1. The General commanding takes this occasion to express to the officers and soldiers of the army his high appreciation of the fortitude, valor, and devotion displayed by them, which, under the blessing of Almighty God, have added the victory of Fredericksburg to the long lists of their triumphs.

An arduous march, performed with celerity under many disadvantages, exhibited the discipline and spirit of the troops and their eagerness to confront twe foe.

The immense army of the enemy completed its pre parations for the attack without interruption, and gave battle in its own time, and on ground of its own selection.

It was encountered by less than twenty thousand of this brave army, and its columns, crushed and broken, hurled back at every point with such fearful slaughter that escape from entire destruction became the best of those who had advanced in full confidenos of victory.

The war is not yet ended. The enemy is still momerous and strong, and the country demands of the army a renewal of its heroic efforts in her beba'f Nobly has it responded to her call in the past, and she will never appeal in vain to its courage and patriotism

The signal manifestations of Divine mercy that have the year just closing, give assurance of hope that, distinguished the eventful and glorious campaign cể der the guidance of the same Almighty hand, the cam

ing year will be no less fruitful of events that will insure the safety, peace, and happiness of our beloved country, and add new lustre to the already imperish able name of the Army of Northern Virginia. R. E. LEE, General.

As a part of the campaign_against Richmond undertaken when Gen. Burnside took command of the army in Virginia, the efforts which were made to cut the Confederate line of communication between Richmond and the southwestern States, should be stated. There are three lines of railroad running south and southwest. The one running southwest passes through southwestern Virginia, eastern Tennessee, northern Alabama, and connects with roads to western Tennessee and to New Orleans. One line running south connects Richmond with Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, and parts of Alabama. A southern line from Richmond, recently completed, passes through central North Carolina and South Carolina. By cutting the former of these roads at Cumberland Gap, reenforcements and supplies could not be brought from the southwest to the Confederate army under Gen. Lee. Neither could reenforcements be taken from Gen. Lee's army to Gen. Bragg at Murfreesborough. By cutting the second line the most direct communication between Richmond and the principal cities of the Confederate States was detroyed.

At the time when Gen. Rosecrans was prepared to move from Nashville to attack the Confederate army near Murfreesborough, an expedition was sent into east Tennessee to destroy the railroad, in order to prevent any reënforcements to Gen. Bragg from Richmond. Gen. Carter, with a force of cavalry numbering one thousand men, left London, in Kentucky, on Dec. 21. They entered Virginia between Cumberland Gap and Pound Gap, and advanced within six miles of Bristol, burned the bridges across the Halston and Watauga rivers, and tore up portions of the track, destroying the rails for a distance of nearly one hundred miles, almost to Jonesborough. They captured nearly five hundred prisoners, seven hundred stand of arms, and a large amount of stores. They reached Manchester, Ky., on the 6th of January, having lost only ten men. The enterprise was a most hazardous one.

The expedition against the second line of railroads was undertaken in North Carolina. It forms the only subsequent military movement of importance, in addition to those heretofore described, which was made in that department during the year. It was a march upon Goldsborough, and the destruction of the railroad at that place. This is the line connecting Charleston and Savannah with Richmond. Gen. J. G. Foster, who commanded the department after the departure of Gen. Burnside, took charge of the expedition. The force consisted of four brigades under Cols. Wessels, Amory, Stevenson, and Lee; the 3d New York and 1st Rhode Island batteries; also sec

tions of the 23d and 24th New York IndependIt left Newbern on the morning of Dec. 11, ent batteries, and the 3d New York cavalry. and moved on the Kinston road fourteen miles. Some parts of the road were obstructed by felled trees. On the next morning it advanced to the Vine Swamp road, having some sharp skirmishing with a small Confederate force. At this point three companies of cavalry were sent up the Kinston road as a demonstration, and the main force took the Vine Swamp road, thereby avoiding the obstructions and the Confederate forces. It was delayed to build the bridge over Beaver Creek, where the 51st Massachusetts and a section of artillery were left to hold it, and support the cavalry on the main road, and halted at a distance of four miles. The next morning the main column advanced, turning to the left and leaving the road it was upon to the right. At the intersection the 46th Massachusetts and a section of a battery were left as a feint and to hold the position. On reaching Southwest Creek a Confederate force was found posted on the opposite bank, about four hundred strong, and with three pieces of artillery. The creek was not fordable, and ran at the foot of a deep ravine. Under the protection of a battery the 9th New Jersey effected a passage and formed on the opposite bank, where it was afterward supported by the 85th Pennsylvania. This caused the Confederate force to retire with some skirmishing. On the next day an advance upon Kinston was made, and the Confederate force found posted in a strong position about one mile from the place. An attack was at once made with the 9th New Jersey in advance, and the position taken. The Confederate force retired across the Neuse river, with a loss of four hundred prisoners. On crossing, the bridge was set on fire, but soon extinguished by the advance of Gen. Foster. The bridge was immediately repaired, and the column crossed, and occupied the town of Kinston. With constant skirmishing the force of Gen. Foster continued to advance until the 17th, when it reached Goldsborough. Here it burned two trestle-work culverts, destroyed a train of four railroad cars, water station, depot, &c., and some small arms, which it was unable to carry off. After destroying other bridges, and capturing some small positions that had been occupied by a Confederate force, the expedition successfully returned to Newbern. This enterprise was very skilfully executed. In connection with movements upon Richmond it would have possessed considerable importance, but in the absence of such movements it only served to interfere for a few days with one line of the Confederate internal communication.

These expeditions, although successful in themselves, secured no important advantages as the great movement upon Richmond had, in the mean time, been suspended. They were useful reconnoissances, and the former may have