Alexander's courtesy to Caulaincourt.

would by no means be forced upon, or even suggested to France by the allies:-that they would limit themselves to declaring the incompatibility of Europe with the conquering dynasty of Napoleon; and that, for all the rest, they were decided on referring the free choice of its government to the opinion of the nation. He added, that the great bodies constituted by Napoleon himself had already loudly declared their return to the ancient royal house, based upon liberal and constitutional institutions. The Emperor, however, yielding a little, as if from complaisance to Caulaincourt, finished by regretting his want of power and his isolation in the council of the sovereigns, and by promising the ambassador that he would plead again the following day the cause of the regency of

Marie-Louise.

The night was far advanced, and day was about to break : the Emperor, as if desirous of sanctioning the hopes that he had given to Caulaincourt, by a still greater act of kindness, made him sleep on a divan in the chamber where he himself slept. The part he had to play was not yet quite settled in his own mind. He had been dazzled at an early age by enthusiasm for Napoleon; he was proud of having measured his strength with him in the page of history; he affected from his infancy, which was trained by revolutionary instructors, the popularity of a prince in advance of his age; he rallied old notions, and the antiquated remains of the court and emigration. He had no inclination for the princes of the house of Bourbon. These princes had only shown at St. Petersburg the externals of the chivalry of their race, at a period when Catherine II. expected from them the temerity of heroism, and when she had lent them her subsidies and her support. Moreover, Alexander dreaded England through these princes, who had become for many years the clients of that power.

Caulaincourt, privately shut up all the following day in the apartment of the Grand Duke Constantine, waited, with a mixture of hope and fear, the result of the last councils, which now multiplied between the sovereigns, the foreign generals, the partisans of the house of Bourbon, the influential members of the Senate, and the marshals of the Emperor. This day

Caulaincourt's anxiety for the result of the royal councils.

was to reveal the fate of Europe, transfer the sceptre from one hand to another, abolish the military government, and bring to an end a domination of which even its glory could no longer lighten the burthen. The reign of the sword was terminating; that of opinion was about to commence.

H

BOO SIXTH.

Alexander at the hotel of M. de Talleyrand-M. de Talleyrand-Night conference of the Allies-Deliberation - Alexander-The Duke d'Alberg-Pozzo di Borgo-M. de Talleyrand-Declaration of the Sovereigns-Royalist deputation to Alexander-Answer of M. de Nesselrode-Royalist Propagandism-The Press-Pamphlet of M. de Chateaubriand: "Bonaparte and the Bourbons"-The public mind-Convocation of the Senate-Sitting of the 1st of April— Formation of the Provisional Government-M. de Talleyrand-The Duke d'Alberg-M. de Jancourt-General Beurnonville-The Abbé de Montesquiou-The Municipal Council-Manifesto of M. Bellart.

I.

AFTER his triumphal entrance into Paris, the Emperor Alexander had dismounted at the hotel of M. de Talleyrand, situated at the angle of the Champs-Elyseé and of the garden of the Tuileries, whose vast and splendid apartments had served as a pretext to the ministers and aides-de-camp of the Emperor for their choice of this residence. But the underhand relations of M. de Talleyrand with the foreign diplomatists of Alexander's cabinet, his private correspondence with the princes of the house of Bourbon, through M. de Vitrolles, a voluntary negociator, bold and active, between royalist opinions and imperialist disaffection, the hatred which M. de Talleyrand sufficiently evinced, since his disgrace, against the Emperor, his influence with the Senate, his credit with old partisans of the revolution, his family connections and intercourse with the highest aristocracy of France, finally, his reputation, almost prophetic, for divining events, now became so great, that when he was seen inclining towards either party in the State, it was looked upon as insuring the fortune of that party. These were the real motives which had conducted Alexander to the hotel of this statesman. Even this favour of the young sovereign, in becoming the guest of the old diplomatist, was calculated to increase the importance which public

Napoleon's suspicions of Talleyrand's intrigues and defection.

opinion already attached to the resolutions of M. de Talleyrand. The royalist party, which knew beforehand that the Restoration would arise out of these conferences, had had the cleverness to place them thus at the very hearth and under the auspices of the statesman whose ear they wished to gain, and whose credit they wished to consolidate.

II.

For a long time past M. de Talleyrand had inspired Napoleon with serious suspicions. He had several times meditated his arrest, in order to put a stop to intrigues and defections, for which his first reverses were to be the signal. He had not, however, dared to do it. Bold and prompt in striking vulgar treason; even cruel, and devoid of justice and of pity towards the Duke d'Enghien, the Sovereign Pontiff, and the princes of the house of Spain, yet Napoleon, at this latter period, had become weak in resolution towards certain leaders of public opinion in his own court, whom he hated, but was obliged to tolerate. He flew into passions, he murmured, he threatened. He broke out intentionally into fits of anger against them, but, when about to strike, his heart failed him. He caressed, he enriched, he made efforts to retain, or to draw towards him, by an excess of benefits, or an apparent confidence, those whom he dreaded the most as secret enemies. It might be said that, implacable as he was towards physical power, he was prudent towards the powers of intelligence and opinion, as if he foresaw that his ruin would spring from the revolt of intellect against material power. Fouché and Talleyrand were two examples of this weakness. Dreading in Fouché a revolutionary conspirator, who might some day or other rekindle the republican spark in the Senate and amongst the people, he contented himself with removing him honourably from Paris, and retaining him in Italy, under the pretext of a superintendence in chief of Rome and Naples. Apprehending in Talleyrand a royalist conspirator, who might, in case of reverse, give up him and his dynasty as a ransom to the old powers of Europe, he had not even ventured to remove him from Paris during his campaign. He placed

Talleyrand's intriguing policy.

him under the surveillance of Savary, his minister of police; but he left him his dignities, his official confidence; even his place in the Council of State, between his brother Joseph and the Empress. M. de Talleyrand had such decided weight with public opinion, that it seemed to the Emperor less dangerous still to tolerate him as a doubtful friend, than to strike him as a declared enemy. This timidity and want of decision hastened his political ruin at home; as they had prepared his military decay in his last campaigns. He had become, as he advanced in years, a man of expedients. This was an inconsistency in principle. Tyranny, which deliberates and compounds, is only the hesitation of violence. M. de Talleyrand knew the Emperor's hatred of him, and the private terror with which he inspired his master. He was decided on having the first blow, and anxiously watched for the hour, to declare himself without imprudence.

III.

At length he thought the hour had arrived, and he seized upon it the day that Joseph and the Empress left Paris with the government. His proper place was in the midst of this fugitive court he received an order to follow it to Blois, and he feigned obedience. He had his equipages prepared ostentatiously, sent some confidants to the barrier, by which he was to depart, got into his carriage, departed, and caused himself to be arrested at the gates of Paris by the accomplices he had posted there. This pretended opposition to his following the imperial government appeared to him a sufficient pretext for returning to his hotel, and remaining at Paris. He thought he should be all right with Napoleon if victory brought him back to his capital, and all right with his enemies if they entered before him. His connection with the allied princes and sovereigns, the hints he had dropt at Petersburg, at Vienna, and at London, his problematical resistance to the murder of the Duke d'Enghien, to the usurpation of the throne of Spain, to Napoleon's ambition for conquest, his influence in the Senate, where he was at the same time the representative of the Emperor's wishes, and the compass which steered the