the Revised Laws; that is, whether it is required that notices for proposals for the drawing of plans for such work shall be posted and published. R. L., c. 20, § 27, provides: All contracts made by them for building, altering, furnishing or repairing public buildings, or for the construction of public works, or for the purchase of supplies, shall, if exceeding eight hundred dollars in amount, be made in writing, after notice for proposals therefor has been posted in a conspicuous place in the county court house for at least one week and has been published at least three times in a newspaper, if any, published in the city or town interested in the work contracted for; otherwise in the newspaper of the most general circulation in the county. They shall, in each case, make and file with the county treasurer a certificate under oath of such publication and posting. All proposals shall be publicly opened in the presence of a majority of the county commissioners and recorded in their records. In an emergency, repairs may be contracted for without such advertisement or posting. They shall certify to the exigency upon the orders to the county treasurer for payment of all bills for such repairs. All contracts made under the provisions of this section, and all changes in, or additions to, or agreements or orders for extras under, such contract, shall be in writing and recorded in a book kept for the purpose with the records of the county. No contract made in violation of the provisions of this section shall be valid against the county, and no payment thereon shall be made by the county. The commissioners may, however, cause county buildings to be repaired by day work, if, in the judgment of the board, expressed in a vote, the best interests of the county require; but no bill in excess of eight hundred dollars for repairs done by day work shall be paid by the county treasurer unless, upon or with the bill, the clerk of the county commissioners has certified that such vote is entered upon their records. The sole question raised is as to the meaning of the phrase "construction of public works." This phrase is susceptible of two interpretations: it may include work of every kind which has any connection, direct or indirect, with the construction of a public work, or it may include only actual building operations in accordance with a plan already prepared. The words "constructed" and "construction" as used in other statutes have been before the court for interpretation. See Donnell v. Starlight, 103 Mass. 227; Attorney-General v. Ware River Railroad Co., 115 Mass. 400; McDonald v. The Nimbus, 137 Mass. 360; Crowell v. Cape Cod Ship Canal Co., 168 Mass. 157. These decisions, however, furnish little assistance in the present inquiry. In Crowell v. Cape Cod Ship Canal Co., supra, the question was, what was meant by the words "all claims for labor performed or furnished in the construction of said canal"? It became necessary to determine whether or not the services of the president and clerk of the corporation, the chief engineer, the assistant engineer and a clerk of the chief engineer were included within this expression. The court decided that these services were not so included, and in the opinion said: Presumably an important part of the services rendered in the engineering department were in locating the canal before beginning the work of construction. But pointed out that the statute made a distinction between locating and constructing in the phrase "said canal company may locate but shall not begin to construct said canal" before making the deposit required by the statute. There is not in the language of R. L., c. 20, § 27, any such clear indication of a limitation upon the meaning of the word "construction." It seems, however, that the meaning of the word as so limited is the more natural one, and, consequently, that in the absence of some special reason for adopting another meaning this meaning is to be adopted. Not only is there no reason for departing from the more usual interpretation, but there is reason to conclude that the Legislature intended to use the word in its more natural and restricted meaning. When plans and specifications for construction have been prepared, proposals for furnishing labor and material can be readily made, since the requirements to be complied with can be definitely stated. When, however, only the general nature of the work contemplated has been determined upon, proposals for drawing the plans for such work cannot be so readily made, since the requirements cannot be definitely stated. In the absence of language which compels an inclusion of the preparation of plans among those things which may be contracted for only after notice for proposals has been posted and published, it is not to be assumed that the Legislature intended it to be so included. I am therefore of opinion that the words "construction of public works" were used by the Legislature with the intention that they be narrowly construed, and that the statute does not require that notice for proposals for the employment of architects to prepare plans shall be posted and published. To the House Third Reading. 1906 February 14. CHARITABLE CORPORATION - SPECIAL CHARTER INCREASE IN HOLDINGS OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY. A corporation chartered under a special act, for the purpose of providing for the support of aged, destitute women not otherwise provided for, may increase its holdings of real and personal property under the general provision of R. L., c. 125, § 8, authorizing any corporation organized under general or special laws for educational, charitable, benevolent or religious purposes to hold real or personal estate to an amount not exceeding $1,500,000, provided that the charter of such corporation contains no provision inconsistent therewith. I beg to acknowledge receipt of your favor of the 8th in reference to House Bill No. 208 and Senate Bill No. 15, of the current year, in which you inquire whether the corporations mentioned therein, namely, the Trustees of Monson Academy and the Association for the Relief of Aged and Destitute Women in Salem, "are empowered by general law to increase their holdings of real and personal estate to the extent specified in the said bills, so that the legislation embodied in these bills would be superfluous." Your letter further states that: It is understood, and is made a part of the question herewith submitted, that a yearly fee for tuition is charged by the Monson Academy, and that a fee, or lump sum, for the admission of inmates is charged by the Association for the Relief of Aged and Destitute Women in Salem; but in neither case is the fee equal to the expenditure made necessary by the admission of a scholar in the one case, or of an inmate in the other. R. L., c. 125, § 2, provides that a corporation may be formed by authority of the chapter, "for any educational, charitable, benevolent or religious purpose.' Section 8 provides: Any corporation organized under general or special laws for any of the purposes mentioned in section two and under sections thirteen to sixteen, inclusive, may hold real and personal estate to an amount not exceeding one million five hundred thousand dollars, which shall be devoted to the purposes set forth in its charter or agreement of association, and it may receive and hold, in trust or otherwise, funds received by gift or bequest to be devoted by it to such purposes. The committee desire to be informed whether or not the corporations hereinbefore named may hold real and personal estate in the amount specified by authority of R. L., c. 125, § 8, without express legislative sanction therefor. In the case of Senate Bill No. 15, the Association for the Relief of Aged and Destitute Women in Salem was incorporated under a special act (St. 1860, c. 183), for the purpose of providing for the support of aged, destitute women not otherwise provided for, and for such purpose was authorized to hold real and personal property to the amount of $100,000. This amount was subsequently increased by St. 1885, c. 21, to $300,000. The purpose for which this association was chartered is clearly a charitable or benevolent one, within the meaning of R. L., c. 125, § 2, since such purpose is for the relief of the needy, the sick or the afflicted. See Chamberlain v. Stearns, 111 Mass. 267; Mass. Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty, etc., v. Boston, 142 Mass. 24; New England Theosophical Soc. v. Boston, 172 Mass. 60. There seems to be no good reason why it might not as well have been incorporated under the general laws existing in 1860 as by special enactment. See St. 1857, c. 56; Gen. Sts., c. 32. It follows, therefore, that it is within the permission given by R. L., c. 125, § 8, and may increase its holdings of real and personal estate to the amount specified. In the case of House Bill No. 208, it is equally clear that the Trustees of Monson Academy are a corporation formed for educational, benevolent or charitable purposes. See Mt. Hermon Boys' School v. Gill, 145 Mass. 139; Wesleyan Academy v. Wilbraham, 99 Mass. 599. But there is a distinction in the lan guage of the act of incorporation (St. 1804, c. 10, by which, in section 2, the corporation is authorized to hold real and personal estate), in that there is the following proviso: Provided, that the annual income of the whole estate of the said corporation shall not exceed five thousand dollars. Assuming that this section has not, since its enactment, been amended so as to destroy the force of this prohibition, I am of opinion that the corporation may not take advantage of the provisions of R. L., c. 125, § 8, and that special legislation is necessary to authorize any increased holdings of real and personal estate by it. To the Metropolitan Park Commission. 1906 February 17. METROPOLITAN PARK COMMISSION - RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE USE OF THE CHARLES RIVER. The Metropolitan Park Commission may, regardless of the ownership of the soil beneath the stream, enact and enforce rules and regulations governing the public use of the Charles River at any point within the metropolitan parks district, provided that such rules and regulations are not repugnant to the power of Congress to regulate commerce, and are not in conflict with the authority to supervise tide waters, vested by R. L., c. 96, § 8, in the Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners. I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of January 31, in which the opinion of the Attorney-General is requested by the Metropolitan Park Commission upon the following questions: First. Whether the commission has authority to enact and enforce rules and regulations governing the public use of the Charles River at any point within the metropolitan parks district, regardless of the ownership of the soil beneath the river; or whether the right is limited to those parts of the river where the Commonwealth, through this commission, owns and controls the bed of the river. Second. If the right to enact and enforce rules and regulations under the act of 1900 is limited to those parts of the river where the commission owns and controls the bed of the river, what authority does the act of 1900 give beyond that contained in section 4 of chapter 407 of the Acts of the year 1893? |