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ence of races must be ashamed and skulk from the face of the world.

"Now, what was that great right that they discovered? It was that all men are born equal.' The black man who brushes the boots of my respected friend from the Luzerne district (Mr. Woodward) is, according to that doctrine, as much entitled to every right and every privilege of a free man and a citizen as that gentleman or myself. And whenever he, or I, or any one else, undertakes to make a distinction between the black race and our own, because of the color of the skin or the formation of the body, he forgets his God, and his God will forget him.

"In other words, we now propose to go to universal and impartial suffrage as the only foundation upon which the Government can stand. You must build all your science of government upon that foundation. When you attempt to depart from it you cease to be men and become tyrants, deserving the execration of the human race. There is no other way than by universal suffrage that you and I and every man can protect himself against the injustice and inhumanity and wrongs that would otherwise be inflicted upon us.

"We have reached a point in the history of this nation when we can adopt that great and glorious principle. We have just builded a nation in whose institutions we can incorporate that principle. And my effort shall be to prove to this House, not simply that we have just reached that point, but that we have reached it by means of the Constitution, not by violating it, although our forefathers, who proclaimed that principle and would have adopted it, could not do so without violating the compact which they themselves had made, and which would have destroyed the great Government they were then building and were bound to defend. We have reached that period which our fathers did not reach and could not reach, when, in speaking of universal suffrage, we must speak of it not as a boon, but as an inalienable right, which no man dare take away, and which no man can rightfully surrender. His God has forbidden it; the science of government has forbidden it.

"Henceforth let us understand that universal suffrage, operating in favor of every man who is to be governed by the votes cast, is one of those doctrines planted deep as the foundations upon which our fathers laid the immortal work of universal liberty, which work of theirs will last just so long as that immortal doctrine shall last, and no longer.

"Whatever construction shall be given to the Constitution in its present condition by this Congress and those nearest, the great events which have modified it will be likely to be accepted through future time as its true meaning. It is important, therefore, that the most beneficent interpretation should be given to it, and that it should be most liberally construed, so as to secure all human rights in the changed

condition of our country and of that instrument which, while it, as to the old States, may not be radically changed, is not so inflexible as to be incapable of accommodating itself to the changing necessities of humanity.

"Before the Constitution was amended I could not agree with some of my learned friends that Congress could intermeddle with State laws relative to the elective franchise in the United States. The circumstance of slavery seemed, while it was submitted to, to prevent it. After the amendment abolishing slavery I still doubted, and proposed a constitutional remedy on the 5th of December, 1865, in the following words:

All national laws shall be equally applicable to every citizen, and no discrimination shall be made on account of race and color.

"Since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, however, I have no doubt of our full power to regulate the elective franchise, so far as it regards the whole nation, in every State of the Union, which, when tried, I hope, will be so formed as to be beneficial to the nation, just to every citizen, and carry out the great designs of the framers of the Government, according to their views expressed in the Declaration of Independence.

"It cannot fail to be beneficial and convenient, when we consider the trouble and inconvenience which a citizen of one State encounters when he travels temporarily into another. Instead of being a brother at home, he is now an alien in his native land. While he participates in all the burdens and anxieties of government, he is forbidden, if a non-resident, to take part in selecting the magistrate who is to rule his destinies for the next four years.

"In this there is no principle of republican justice. The Constitution of 1789 did not carry out the principles of government which were intended by the fathers when in 1776 they laid the foundations of the Government on which this nation was built. Then they had been inspired with such a light from on high as never man was inspired with before in the great work of providing freedom for the human race through a government in which no oppression could find a resting-place.

"They contemplated the erection of a vast empire over the whole continent, which in its national character should be governed by laws of a supreme, unvarying character. While municipal institutions with self-control might be granted for convenience, it was never intended that one half of this nation should be governed by one set of laws and the other half by another and conflicting set on the same subject.

"The laws which were then intended to be universal must now be made universal. The principles which were intended to govern the whole American nationality must now be made to cover and control the whole national action throughout this grand empire. Towns, corporations, and municipalities may be allowed

their separate organizations not inconsistent therewith, but must not incorporate any principles in conflict with those great rights, privileges, and immunities. What are those rights, privileges, and immunities? Without excluding others, three are specifically enumeratedlife, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. These are universal and inalienable. It follows that every thing necessary for their establishment and defence is within those rights. You grant a lot or easement in the midst of your estate; you thereby grant the right of way to it by ingress and egress. Disarm a community and you rob them of the means of defend ing life. Take away their weapons of defence, and you take away the inalienable right of defending liberty. This brings us now directly to the argument by which we prove that the elective franchise is a right of the Declaration, and not merely a privilege, and is one of the rights and immunities pronounced by that instrument to be 'inalienable.'

"If, as our fathers declared, 'all just government is derived from the assent of the governed; if in federal republics that assent can be ascertained and established only through the ballot, it follows, that to take away that means of communication is to take away from the citizen his great weapon of defence and reduce him to helpless bondage. It deprives him of an inalienable right. This clearly proves that the elective franchise ranks with life' and 'liberty' in its sacred, inalienable character. But, while the Declaration clearly proves what the intention then was, the action of the Convention in framing the Constitution of the United States, it seems to me, bartered away for the time being some of those inalienable rights, and, instigated by the hell ish institution of slavery, suspended one of the muniments of liberty. Having thus shown that the elective franchise is one of the inalienable rights of man, without which his liberty cannot be defended, and that it was suspended by the arbitrary Constitution of 1789, let us see if that suspension has been removed, so as to leave our hands unrestrained in restoring its full vigor while still acting under the Constitution. That right appertains to every citizen. But while this suspension existed the natural love of despotism induced communities to hold that each State might fix the qualifications, rights, and deprivations of its own citizens.

"The fourteenth amendment, now so happily adopted, settles the whole question and places every American citizen on a perfect equality, so far as merely national rights and questions are concerned."

Mr. Spalding, of Ohio, said: "Mr. Speaker, I do not wish to occupy much of the time of the House; but I desire to remark that only last October I was called upon as a citizen of Ohio to vote upon a proposition to amend the constitution of that State by inserting a provision giving the right of suffrage to the free

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black man equally with the white man. only voted cheerfully for that proposition, but I used all my influence with my fellow-citizens in my section of the State to induce them to ingraft that provision upon our State constitution. It was unsuccessful. We were in advance of the sentiment of our people; they voted down the proposition by forty thousand majority. Now, I would like to see the member of Congress from the State of Ohio who would have the boldness to vote for the passage of this bill, which, in my judgment, cuts directly across the Constitution of the United States, and, in fact, derides the action of the people of my State in refusing to insert in their constitution of State government a provision granting this general right of suffrage to the blacks as well as the whites.

"Sir, I believe the day may come when our Constitution, the great charter of our liberties, shall be so amended that all free people may vote. God hasten the day when that right may be so extended! But, sir, so long as the Constitution remains as it is, I will sooner suffer my right arm to drop from its socket than vote for any such bill as that now before us. And, in saying this, I am bold to affirm that I speak the sentiments of a large majority of my colleagues on this floor, irrespective of party. I should regard the passage of this bill at this bour as the death-knell of our hopes as a political party in the approaching Presidential canvass.

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Mr. Kelley, of Pennsylvania, said: "Mr. Speaker, I have no hope that this bill will be adopted by this Congress. I will gladly give it my vote when brought to that test, and in doing so will, in my judgment, act strictly. within the letter and intent of the Constitution, and but exercise a power which the framers of the Constitution and the members of the State conventions that accepted it knew they had embodied in it.

"The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Spalding) hastened to announce, as did my colleague from the Washington district (Mr. Lawrence, of Pennsylvania), that the question of colored suffrage is not a party question. I admit and deplore the fact that it is not, for the Republican party is founded upon the theory of the equality of man before the law, and the fact that the consent of the governed is the only legitimate basis for government. Those are accepted party doctrines, and I take it for granted that those members of the Republican party who deny the colored citizens' right to vote, like the leaders of the Democratic party, deny the humanity and the immortality of the great mass of mankind, for the majority of the human race are of those shades of complexion and that character of blood to which, while asserting the equal rights of man, they deny equality before the laws.

"I regret that the Republican party has not risen to the height of applying its principles as a test to all questions, and carrying them into

execution to their last result. There is no difference between my colleague and myself as to its halting on the question of suffrage." Mr. Kerr, of Indiana, said: "I hold that the bill now under consideration cannot have any shadow of legal authorization under the Constitution of the United States as it stands to-day. I agree with the distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Spalding), that it runs directly across the Constitution. But it is the fixed and cherished policy of the majority in this House to change the Federal Constitution. It is their deliberate purpose, to-morrow, or next week, or a month hence, or as soon as they can, to make the Federal Constitution a different instrument from what it now is. And then, under the somewhat latitudinarian expressions contained in the proposed fourteenth article of amendments to the Constitution, not only will this bill, but almost every other kind that the party majority here can desire, be introduced into this House and enacted into a law."

No decisive action was taken on this bill, at this session, by either House.

In the Senate, on December 4th, Mr. Trumbull, of Illinois, from the Judiciary Committee, reported a bill declaring what shall constitute a quorum of the Supreme Court, and asked for its present consideration.

The bill was read twice and considered as in Committee of the Whole, by unanimous consent. It provided that any number of the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, not less than five, and being a majority of the court, shall constitute a quorum.

Mr. Trumbull said: "I will state the reason for the bill. The court formerly consisted of ten members, and at that time the law required six to constitute a quorum. As the law now stands the court is to be reduced to seven, as vacancies occur; it is already reduced to eight; and the justices of the court, I am informed, find a difficulty in making up the quorum of six; and it will be still more difficult when there are but seven on the bench. One or two of the judges at this time are unwell, and of the whole number, eight, it requires six to constitute a quorum. This bill provides that five shall constitute a quorum, there being now but eight judges, and that it shall also require that number even when the court is reduced to

seven."

The bill was reported to the Senate without amendment.

Mr. Johnson, of Maryland, said: "It is very desirable it should pass. The court was very near being without a quorum to-day, and the probability is, in the present condition of things, that it may be often without a quorum during the session."

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading; was read the third time, and passed.

In the House, on January 13th, Mr. Wilson,

of Iowa, from the Committee on the Judiciary, reported back the Senate bill to constitute a quorum in the Supreme Court, with an amendment, as follows:

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That no cause pending before the Supreme Court of the United States, which involves the action or effect of any law of the United States, shall be decided adversely to the validity of such law without the concurrence of twothirds of all the members of said court in the decision

upon the several points in which said law or any part thereof may be deemed invalid.

Mr. Williams, of Pennsylvania, offered the following as a substitute for the amendment reported by the committee:

That in all cases of writs of error from and appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of or an authority exercised by the United States, or the construction of any clause of the Constitution of the United States, or the validity of a statute of or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of repugnance to the Constitution or laws of the United States, the hearing shall be had only before a full bench of the judges of said court, and no judg ment shall be rendered or decision made against the validity of any statute or of any authority exercised by the United States, except with the concurrence of all the judges of said court.

He said: "The amendment which I offer requires unanimity on the part of the Supreme Court. The amendment of the committee

stops at two-thirds.

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"My own judgment is that there is no reason that will apply, no argument that can be offered in favor of the amendment of the committee, which does not apply with equal force to the amendment submitted by myself. Still, I was not prepared to meet this question now. did not feel that the bill itself, as prepared by myself, was sufficient in its details to meet the exigencies of the case. There is nothing in it to provide for the contingencies that may arise in the decision of causes in the circuit court. It wants further arrangement. It wants to be perfected. It wants full consideration. If I may be allowed to say it, this is a big question. I do not think that the passage of the bill can be facilitated by forcing it through here. Gentlemen seem to be of the opinion that delay would not answer. My opinion is different. I do not think it will pass any sooner by being forced through here to-day or to-morrow. It seems to me that, if it is well argued here, the principle might be so well vindicated as to satisfy, perhaps, the other branch of the Legislature.

"But there is an apprehension that the country will suffer by any delay. It is said that there is a case now depending in the Supreme Court of the United States upon which this question may be ruled to-day or to-morrow. Suppose such be the fact I do not know that there is any such case-but suppose that such be the fact, that such a case is now depending there, and a decision is made by the court, what harm can it effect? Instead of harm, I think it will do good, because it will awaken

both Houses of Congress to the necessity of some such provision as this, intended, as it is, to defend the legislative power, which is the true sovereign power of the nation. Suppose the Supreme Court do make the decision apprehended, what will be the result? It will be the law in that individual case and no more. And a bill passed by the two Houses, upon full consideration, well matured as it ought to be, and which I take it this is not, can be enacted in time to prevent any further mischief to the country, if any mischief can be inflicted now by a decision of that sort."

Mr. Pruyn, of New York, said: "We have here to-day propositions of a most extraordinary character. First, we have had a proposition to strip ten States of every remaining evidence of their sovereignty, and the Executive of his constitutional power; and now we are startled by another measure calculated virtually to rob the Supreme Court of the United States of the authority which has given it influence, dignity, and strength before the country and before the world, and which has been conceded to that tribunal from the inauguration of the Government to the present time; and this measure is proposed, as the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Williams) has admitted, in view of the fact that that court may possibly make a decision which will come in conflict with the views and opinions of a majority of the members of this House. I am sure that this open, bold, daring avowal will strike the country with surprise; and I am glad to find that even the gentleman from Pennsylvania falters when he approaches this point, and wishes to have the measure considered with more care and more deliberation than the majority of this House seem disposed to give to it. I cordially agree with him, if any thing is to be done, if any outrage of this kind is to be perpetrated, it should be done at least with that regard to decency of form and time and action which will give its authors at least some pretence for inflicting it upon the country; and I trust, sir, without entering into any extended debate in reference to this matter, because it has come upon me most unexpectedly, that the suggestion of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Williams) to postpone this discussion to a future time, will receive the sanction of the House."

Mr. Spalding, of Ohio, said: "The question with me is, is action of this sort on the part of Congress by itself constitutional? That is, have we a right under the Constitution to provide that, in adjudicating upon constitutional questions, two-thirds of the Supreme Court shall unite in their opinion before an act shall be pronounced unconstitutional? If we have not the constitutional power thus to legislate, our action will be futile, because this same tribunal will scan it closely and pass upon it, and they may pronounce it unconstitutional. Even though it has the concurrence of both branches of Congress and the approval

of the President, the court can still declare it unconstitutional.

"Now, Mr. Speaker, I do not propose to take up much time in discussing this question; but I say that, if I were qualified for a seat upon the supreme bench of the United States, and had by any possibility arrived at that honor, nothing would gratify me more than the passage by Congress of the measure that is here introduced to-day by the chairman of the Judiciary Committee. I do not believe, now, at this moment, that any judge of that high tribunal would object to a requisition on the part of Congress that, in order to declare a nact of Congress unconstitutional, it shall require twothirds of their number to pass upon the question. Why, it relieves them from very great responsibilities. It makes the decision more satisfactory to themselves and far more satisfactory to those whom the decision affects. It is not to be made by a single voice when the court consists of seven, three on one side and three on the other, and one man turns the scale. But it requires the united opinion of two-thirds of all the members of the Supreme Court to pronounce an act of Congress unconstitutional.

"Now, sir, I object to the amendment which requires that every judge shall assent to the decision, because I think that is requiring too much. It will not do to assume that the bench of judges of our country are perfect, any more than that the Senate and the House of Representatives of Congress are perfect. I grant you that there is less likelihood of their giving way to passion and caprice, because they are selected for their wisdom and experience and supposed stability."

Mr. Wilson, of Iowa, moved to amend the amendment of the committee by adding thereto the following:

Provided, however, That if any circuit or district court of the United States shall adjudge any act of Congress to be unconstitutional or invalid, the judgment, before any further proceedings shall be had upon it, shall be certified up to the Supreme Court of the United States and shall be considered therein; and, if, upon the consideration thereof, two-thirds of all the members of the Supreme Court shall not affirm said judgment below, the same shall be declared and

held reversed.

Mr. Woodward, of Pennsylvania, said: "The part of the bill to which I object is that part which requires two-thirds of the court, and the amendment the unanimous opinion of the judges, to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional. The amendment, as I once heard it read, requires the unanimous vote of the court, but the bill itself, as moved by the gentleman from Iowa, requires two-thirds. It is to that part of the bill I am here to object. The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Bingham) may be very adroit in substituting another point, diverting our attention to that, but I am determined to keep my eyes steadily upon what I conceive to be the real objection to this bill. I say, in reply to the amendment and in reply

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to the bill itself, so far as a two-thirds vote is concerned, it is an attempt on the part of the legislative department to dictate to the judicial department as to the manner in which they shall exercise their judicial power. That you cannot do. It is as gross an attempt as if the judiciary should dictate to the legislative department how it shall exercise its powers. It is not a question of quorum, it is a question of judicial power. You say it shall not be exercised in the manner in which it is exercised. The Constitution says that it shall be exercised by that body according to its responsibility to the people.

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'Now, sir, I maintain, if the majority of the Supreme Court is competent to decide a question of property, a question of liberty, a question of life, it is competent to decide a constitutional question; and it possesses the right to decide it upon the same principles or tenure it decides the others. It holds power in both cases by virtue of the fundamental law of the land, and therefore Congress can neither add to nor subtract from it.

"This is my principal objection to the bill and amendment. Another less important objection is, that it will be found impracticable. I venture to affirm, if the House passes this bill or this amendment, or both the bill with the amendment, it will be found not only difficult but in some cases impossible for the court to mature its judgments on the principles of this bill. Suppose, sir, there are seven judges and seven sections of an act of Assembly or act of Congress for State as well as Federal law may come before it—and one judge thinks it is unconstitutional for what is contained in one section, another judge for what is contained in another section; you may, if you please, suppose every judge shall declare that law to be unconstitutional for separate and distinct reasons; that for his own reasons he holds the law unconstitutional and for the reasons of the other judges he holds it to be constitutional, under this bill how is that court to decide that question? Is that law unconstitutional under the judgment of that court?"

Mr. Hubbard, of Connecticut, said: "The bill as it was reported requires, as I understand, a majority of two-thirds. The amendment of fered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Williams) requires that there shall be unanimity of the bench. I agree with the gentleman who offered that amendment, that, if the bill reported by the committee can be justified, the amendment offered by himself can be justified on just the same grounds.

"Now, how is the Supreme Court constituted? It consists of those judges, and those only, who may be appointed by law to sit on that bench. How many are necessary to render judgment? That question is easily answered. A majority only, by the well-settled principle of the common law, is necessary to action in all public bodies, judicial or otherwise. In a private tribunal, as a board of arbitrators, for

instance, unanimity is required; but in a board composed of public officers a majority only is requisite. Now, when the Constitution provided a Supreme Court, the common law provided that a majority may pronounce the judgment of that court. If this be not so, then I ask, may not this Congress take away from the citizen the right of a jury trial? The Constitution provides that every citizen shall have this right. What constitutes a jury? Can this Congress determine that five, six, eight, or ten, or any number less or more than twelve, shall constitute a jury? By no manner of means. Why? Because the term jury had a common-law meaning when the Constitution was framed and adopted. And as the term jury had a definite common-law meaning which required unanimity in its decision, so the phrase Supreme Court had involved in it a common-law signification and rule which prescribed that as a law of the body a majority only was necessary to an award of judgment. Such being the fact, this Congress cannot alter the rule applicable to the court unless it can alter the rule applicable to the verdict of a jury. I deny, therefore, that the legislative power can determine what number is necessary to render judgment in a case before the Supreme Court.

“And this, I submit, has been the construction that has been put upon this question from the beginning. Among all the acts that have been referred to by the gentlemen who represent the other side of this question, there is not one to be found which is any thing else than a mere declaration of the common law requiring a mere majority to render a judgment of the court. There is not an act to be found that requires more than a majority. And those acts which require majorities are simply declaratory of the common law. I deny, therefore, that this Congress has any authority to say what shall constitute a quorum of the Supreme Court.

"But more than that, I submit that it would be both impolitic and inexpedient, even if this Congress were omnipotent in this regard, to attempt to enact such a rule as is embodied in either the bill reported by the committee or the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Williams). It is perfectly well known that it is intended to reach a particular case; and this bill, without being printed, without allowing members of the House an opportunity of ever seeing it, but only of catching it by the ear as it fell from the Clerk, in hot, in indecent haste, is submitted to the House for action, and each one of us is required to pass upon it at the tap of the drum. Why this impetuous haste? Because it happens to be rumored-I know not whether truly or notthat the Supreme Court by a majority, perhaps by a large majority, are adverse to a particular measure upon which the majority of this Congress are disposed to stake their political life. Because they have learned in advance that the judicial mind of the Supreme Court condemns

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