the property of animal to perceive, than of man to know, but it is not the property of animal to perceive, it would not be the property of man to know. We confirm it indeed, if the less is the property of the less, for the more will also be the property of the more; thus, since it is less the property of man to be naturally mild than of animal to live, but it is the property of man to be naturally mild, it would be the property of animal to live.

Thirdly, we subvert it, if it is not the property 3. The rather of which it is more the property, since neither property. will it be the property of that of which it is less the property, but if it is the property of that, it will not be the property of this. Thus, since to be coloured is more the property of superficies than of body, but it is not the property of superficies, neither would to be coloured be the property of body; if however it is the property of superficies, it would not be the property of body. This place indeed is not useful to the confirmer, since it is impossible that the same thing should be the property of many.

4. If the more be not property.

Fourthly, it is subverted if what is more the property (of the thing), is not its property, since neither will what is less its property be the property, e. g. since the sensible is more the property of animal than the partible, but the sensible is not the property of animal, the partible would not be the property of animal. But it is confirmed if what is less its property is the property of it, since what is more its property will be the property; thus, since it is less the property of animal to perceive than to live, but to perceive is the property of animal, to live would be the property of animal.

2. We also ascertain whether property is rightly assign

ed, from things

of similar subsistence.

Next, from things which exist similarly, first indeed subverting, if what is similarly the property, is not the property of that of which it is similarly the property, since neither will what is similarly property be the property of this of which it is similarly the property. Thus, since it is similarly the property of the appetitive part of the soul to desire, and of the reasoning part to reason * but to desire is not the property of the appetitive part, neither would to reason be the property of the reasoning part. On the other hand, we con

1st Topic of subversion.

Vide Ethics 1. 13, and iii. 12.

;

2nd.

firm it, if what is similarly property is the property of this of which it is similarly the property; for what is similarly property will be the property of this thing of which it is simi larly the property. For instance, since what is primarily prudent is similarly the property of the reasoning part, and what is primarily temperate of the appetitive part, but what is primarily prudent is the property of the reasoning, the primarily temperate would be the property of the appetitive part. Secondly, we subvert it, if what is similarly the property (of a thing) is not its property, since neither will what is similarly property be the property of it. Thus, since it is similarly the property of man to see and to hear, but to see is not the property of man,' neither would the property of man be to hear. Again, we confirm it, if what is similarly the property (of a thing) is its property, for what is similarly its property will be the property; thus, since it is similarly the property of the soul that a part of it should be appetitive primarily and argumentative, but it is the property of the soul that a part of it is primarily appetitive, it would be the property of the soul that a part of it is primarily argumentative.

Thirdly, it is subverted, if it is not the pro- 3rd.

perty of what it is similarly the property, since

neither will it be the property of what it is similarly the property, but if it is the property of that, it will not be the property of the other. Thus, since to burn is similarly the property of flame and of a burning coal, but it is not the property of flame to burn, neither would it be the property of a burning coal to burn, but if it is the property of flame, it would not be the property of a burning coal: this place however is of no use to him who confirms.

tion drawn.

Nevertheless, (the place) from things similarly affected, differs from that from things similarly in- 4th. A distinc herent, because the one is assumed according to analogy, and is not considered in respect of something being

1 Because "non convenit soli, nec semper." Vide Aldrich. I have already observed that the fourth kind only of property mentioned by Aldrich, is regarded by Aristotle and Porphyry as idov: the first and third kinds, enunciated by Aldrich, are each a separable, the second kind an inseparable, accident.

Because the same thing, cannot be the property of many things. Taylor.

inherent, but the other is compared from something being inherent.

CHAP. IX.-Topics upon Property as to Capacity, etc.

1. Property subverted if assigned in ca

pacity to what

is not.

NEXT, property is subverted indeed, if he who assigns it in capacity, assigns also that property in capacity, to that which is not; capacity being by no possibility present with a non-entity, for what is laid down to be, will not be, property. Thus, since he who says the property of air is that which may be breathed, assigns property in capacity, (for a property of this kind is that which is capable of being breathed,) but also assigns the property to that which is not; for although an animal should not exist, which is naturally capable of breathing the air, yet the air may exist, though if animal is not, it is not possible to breathe; hence a thing of such a kind as that it may be breathed, will not then be the property of air, when there will not be such an animal as can breathe, wherefore what may be breathed would not be the property of air.

vice versa.

Again, we confirm it, if he who assigns it in 2. Confirmed, capacity either assigns the property to that which is, or to that which is not, when capacity may be present with what is not, since what is stated not to be property, will be property. Thus, since he who assigns as the property of being, the ability to suffer or to act, assigning property in capacity, has assigned property to being, (for when being is, it will also be able to suffer, or to do, something,) hence ability to suffer or to act, would be the property of being.

3. Subverted if

hyperbole.

Next, it is subverted, if it is placed in hyperlaid down in bole, since what is laid down to be, will not be property. For it happens to those who thus assign property, that the name is not verified in respect of what the sentence is verified, since the thing being corrupted, the sentence will nevertheless remain, for it will especially be present with something existing; thus, if some one should assign the property of fire to be the lightest body, for when fire is corrupted, there will be a certain body, which will be the lightest, so that the lightest body would not be the property of fire. It is confirmed however, if

*

i. e. the property.

the property is not placed in hyperbole, for as to this, the property will be well stated, e. g. since he who states the property of man, to be an animal naturally mild, does not assign property in hyperbole, so far as regards this, the property would be well stated.

BOOK VI.

1. Five parts of

definitional discussion. finition.

* i. e. the de

ti. e. the thing

defined.

CHAP. I.-On Places connected with Definition. THERE are five parts of the discussion of definition, for (the latter is reprehended), because it is not altogether true to assert that the sentence* (is predicated) of what the name † is; (since it is necessary that the definition of man, should be verified of every man ;) or because when there is a genus, it does not place the thing defined in the genus, or not in its appropriate genus; (for it is necessary that the person defining, placing the thing defined in genus, should add the differences, since of things in the definition, genus especially seems to signify the substance of the thing defined ;) or because the sentence is not proper; (since it is necessary that definition should be proper, as was before observed; ‡) or if, though it has effected all the things stated, it does not define, nor state, what the nature is, of the thing defined. The remainder is, besides what we have mentioned, if it is defined indeed, but not defined well. Whether, then, the sentence also is not verified of what the name is, must be observed from places belonging to accident,1 since there also the whole consideration is, whether it is true or not true, for when we show by discussion that accident is inherent, we say that it is true, but when that it is not inherent, (we call it) untrue. Whether, again, the assigned definition is not

Vide b. i. c. 6.

2. Three of

these enunciated, lib. ii.

4, 5.

.1 Because from these we shall be able to ascertain whether what the definition enunciates, can be predicated wholly of the thing defined; the first rule of definition being, that it should be adequate to the thing defined, which is also intimated above. Upon this book, cf. Aldrich, Whately, Hill, and Mansel, (Logics,) also Appendix note B of the last. See also Rassow, (Arist. de Notion. Def. Doct.,) Crakanthorpe, and Wallis.

placed in its proper genus, or is not proper, must be observed from places spoken about genus and property.

3. The remain

about proper definition, or

its subsistence

It remains, then, to declare how we must ining inquiry is stitute an inquiry, whether a thing is not defined, or whether it is not rightly defined; first, indeed, then we must see whether it is not rightly defined, since it is easier to do any thing (merely), than to do it well. Now it is clear that an error is more frequent about this, because it is more difficult, so that reasoning about this is easier than about that.

at all.

4. Two parts about right definition.

Of the (question of defining) not rightly, there are two parts, one whether obscurity is employed in the interpretation, (since it is necessary that the person defining should make use of the clearest possible interpretation, as definition is assigned, for the sake of knowledge,) and the other, whether he has stated the definition more extensively than is requisite, as every thing added in the definition is superfluous. Again, each of the above-named is divided into many parts.

1. Definition faulty from

CHAP. II.-Of Places relative to defining rightly.

obscurity, if an equivocal statement be employed, or the thing defined be equivocal.

ONE place, then, belonging to the obscure is, if what is stated is equivocal with any thing, as that generation is a leading to substance, and that health is the harmony of hot and cold, for (the words) leading and harmony are equivocal, therefore it is doubtful which of the things signified, by what is multifariously predicated, a person wishes to assert. In like manner also, if when the thing defined is multifariously predicated, a person expresses himself without distinction, as it will be dubious of what he has given the definition, and it is possible to cavil, as if the definition were not adapted to every thing of which he has given the definition. Now, such a thing it is especially possible to do, when there is latent equivocation, and also it is possible, when a person has distinguished in how many ways what is assigned in the definition is predicated, to form a syllogism: for if it is not sufficiently stated in any mode, it is clear that it has not been defined according to that mode.

· Ct Waitz.